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RETHINKING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF  
HIGH VOLUME AGENCY ADJUDICATION 
 
Jonah B. Gelbach & David Marcus∗ 
 
Abstract.  Article III courts annually review thousands of decisions 
rendered by Social Security Administrative Law Judges, Immigration 
Judges, and other agency adjudicators who decide large numbers of cases 
in short periods of time.  Federal judges can provide a claim for disability 
benefits or for immigration relief the sort of consideration that an agency 
buckling under the strain of enormous caseloads cannot.  Judicial review 
thus seems to help legitimize systems of high volume agency adjudication.  
Even so, influential studies rooted in the gritty realities of this decision-
making have concluded that the costs of judicial review outweigh whatever 
benefits the process creates.  
We argue that the scholarship of high volume agency adjudication 
has overlooked a critical function that judicial review plays.  The large 
numbers of cases that disability benefits claimants, immigrants, and others 
file in Article III courts enable federal judges to engage in what we call 
“problem-oriented oversight.”  These judges do not just correct errors 
made in individual cases or forge legally binding precedent.  They also can 
and do identify entrenched problems of policy administration that afflict 
agency adjudication.  By pressuring agencies to address these problems, 
Article III courts can help agencies make across-the-board improvements in 
how they handle their dockets.  Problem-oriented oversight significantly 
strengthens the case for Article III review of high volume agency 
adjudication.   
This Article describes and defends problem-oriented oversight 
through judicial review.  We also propose simple approaches to analyzing 
data from agency appeals that Article III courts can use to improve the 
oversight they offer.  Our argument comes out of a several-year study of 
social security disability benefits adjudication that we conducted on behalf 
of the Administrative Conference of the United States.  The research for this 
study gave us rare insight into the day-to-day operations of an agency 
struggling to adjudicate huge numbers of cases quickly, and a court system 
attempting to help this agency improve. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Federal administrative agencies adjudicate huge numbers of cases.  
Administrative law judges (“ALJs”) working for the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”), “probably the largest adjudication agency in the 
western world,”1 decided 629,337 claims for disability benefits in 2013.2  
That year the country’s immigration judges (“IJs”) completed 253,942 
“matters”,3 and veterans’ law judges working for the Board of Veterans 
Appeals disposed of 41,910 veterans’ benefits cases.4  ALJs at the Office of 
Medicare Hearings and Appeals issued 79,377 decisions in cases involving 
Medicare payments and coverage, an effort quickly swamped by the 
384,151 new filings the agency received in 2013.5  Such immense caseloads 
require agency adjudicators to work with astonishing speed.  The average 
SSA ALJ decided nearly 540 cases in 2013, or more than two per workday,6 
and the average IJ that year resolved matters for more than 1,000 
immigrants.7  The quality of adjudication often buckles under this furious 
pace, and criticism for slipshod, inconsistent decision-making has long 
dogged these agencies.8 
 With their power of judicial review, the federal courts sit atop this 
mountain of adjudication.9  Time-strapped agency adjudicators have to rule 
under conditions hardly conducive to thoughtful deliberation.  The fact that 
a federal judge offers a backstop against arbitrary decision-making thus 
                                                
1 Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 28-29 (2003). 
2 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, JUSTIFICATIONS OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS 
COMMITTEES FISCAL YEAR 2015 144 (2014). 
3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIG. REV., FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK 
A2 (2014). 
4 U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS ANNUAL REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 2013 24 (2014). 
5 Statistics are available at https://acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/caseload-statistics. 
6 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AUDIT 
REPORT, THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE THE HEARING 
BACKLOG 4 (2015). 
7 253 IJs were on the bench in FY 2013.  HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE U.S. IMMIGRATION 
COURT: A BALLOONING BACKLOG THAT REQUIRES ACTION 1 (2016). 
8 E.g., HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, ACHIEVING GREATER CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL 
SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 
(2013); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007); James D. Ridgway, A Benefits System for the Information 
Age, 7 VETERANS L. REV. 36, 44 (2015). 
9 The federal courts can review agency decisions subject to the limits Congress specifies.  
Five Flags Pipe Line Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 854 F.2d 1438, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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offers something of a psychological salve.10  Whatever happens within the 
agency, so the thinking goes, the unfairly denied disability claimant or the 
immigrant wrongly threatened with deportation can always get justice in an 
Article III court.  For this reason and others, judicial review is thought to 
“secure an imprimatur of legitimacy for administrative action.”11 
 But reality intrudes on this appealing view.  The availability of 
judicial review for what we call “high volume agency adjudication” – 
adjudication by agencies whose caseloads and available personnel limit 
adjudicators to no more than a minimal amount of time per case – means 
that the federal courts feed on a sizable diet of administrative appeals.  The 
7,225 cases immigrants filed in 2013, for instance, increased the federal 
appellate docket by 12.8%.12  These appeals and others from agencies are 
indisputably significant to the judicial business of the federal courts.   
But is federal court litigation likewise important to harried 
adjudicators drowning in claims or the agencies that struggle to manage 
them?  The federal courts review only a tiny fraction of the cases agency 
adjudicators decide – only 3% of SSA ALJ decisions, for example,13 and 
only about .03% of decisions by the Office of Medicare Hearings and 
Appeals.14  Whatever legitimacy the Article III courts promise must seem 
like a distant mirage for the vast majority of immigrants, claimants, and 
others as they litigate in obscure hearing rooms, far away from the grandeur 
of the federal courts.  Doubts that judicial review helps to improve high 
volume agency adjudication have thus surfaced in administrative law 
scholarship, perhaps no more importantly than in the seminal studies of 
social security disability adjudication that Jerry Mashaw wrote in the 1970s 
and 1980s.15  
                                                
10 Cf. LOUIS JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965) 
(describing judicial review as a “necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a 
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate”). 
11 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 942 (1988). 
12 http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/B03Sep13.pdf. 
13 On federal court filings in 2013, see 
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC04_NCC_Filed_Appealable.html. 
14 In FY 2014, claimants filed only 25 Medicare appeals in the federal courts.  Email from 
Katherine E. Hosna, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to David Marcus, May 
22, 2017 (on file with authors).   
15 JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 185 (1983); JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., 
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM 146 (1978); Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling 
Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1323 (2014); Paul R. Verkuil & 
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability 
Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 778-782 (2003).   
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 This Article defends the federal courts’ involvement in high volume 
agency adjudication.  It has its roots in our sense of what happens day-to-
day in hearing offices, immigration courts, and federal judges’ chambers 
around the country.  We recently completed a two-year study of social 
security disability benefits litigation, conducted at the behest of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States.16  This study required an 
extensive quantitative analysis of district court decision-making, as well as 
scores of interviews with agency officials, ALJs and their support staff, 
federal judges, and private lawyers.  It thus gave us a rich perspective on 
almost every aspect of federal court involvement with the disability benefits 
adjudication process.  A theoretical companion to the report we produced 
for the Administrative Conference, this Article uses the trove of information 
we assembled to inform our understanding of what exactly the federal 
courts can be – and in some instances are – up to when they review 
decisions issued by overworked, under-resourced agency adjudicators. 
 Our main contribution is to identify a previously unappreciated 
function that courts perform when they review high volume agency 
adjudication.  Judges correct adjudicators’ errors, and they forge precedent 
to regulate agency decision-making.  These jobs are well known, although 
this Article provides a badly needed reassessment of how well courts tackle 
them.  The function not evident to critics of judicial review is a task we call 
“problem-oriented oversight.”  Courts identify and respond to entrenched 
problems of internal agency administration that can afflict adjudication.  
When bias discolors an IJ’s decision-making and the agency does not 
respond, for example, courts can do so effectively.  When the SSA issues a 
guidance document that distorts ALJ orders denying disability benefits 
claims, the federal courts can push the agency to correct course.  Problem-
oriented oversight involves more than the correction of adjudicator error or 
the issuance of precedent-setting opinions.  The federal courts use various 
tools at their disposal to hold agencies accountable and insist that they 
improve.  Added to the other functions federal courts discharge, problem-
oriented oversight strengthens the case for Article III review of high volume 
agency adjudication. 
Our argument toggles between the descriptive and the normative.  
Courts presently engage in problem-oriented oversight.  We identify the 
function and describe how federal judges perform it.  We also explain how 
courts can use a straightforward data gathering and analysis method to 
conduct oversight more rigorously.  Finally, we defend the federal courts’ 
oversight capacity.  Institutional features of courts and agencies limit how 
well federal judges can correct adjudicators’ errors and regulate agencies 
                                                
16 See JONAH B. GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, A STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2016). 
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through precedent.  These impediments pose less of a problem to courts’ 
oversight function.  By relying upon a process that requires aggrieved 
parties to bring problems to their attention, the federal courts can assemble 
information about poor agency performance efficiently.  Their 
independence from agencies and Congress enables federal judges to address 
pathologies afflicting agency decision-making without politics or other 
agency priorities getting in the way.  Finally, the federal courts’ geographic 
dispersion and prestige make them effective overseers of a sprawling 
system of agency adjudication, and the sort of data gathering and analysis 
problem-oriented oversight requires fit within courts’ competencies.   
Understanding problem-oriented oversight is important for several 
reasons.  First, appeals from overwhelmed agency adjudicators compose a 
large chunk of the federal courts’ docket.  In 2013, for instance, claimants 
appealed 18,779 SSA ALJ decisions to federal district courts,17 nearly 
equaling federal habeas corpus filings.18  A fully informed perspective on 
what Article III judges do on a daily basis requires an appreciation for 
problem-oriented oversight.   
Second, legislators, judges, agency officials and scholars frequently 
call for changes to various systems of high volume agency adjudication.  
Proposals have included the centralization of judicial review in a single 
Article III court,19 retrenchment of Article III review,20 and the end to 
Article III review altogether.21  To our minds, problem-oriented oversight, 
when added to the other functions judges discharge when they oversee high 
volume agency adjudication, tips an otherwise equivocal normative balance 
in favor of the current system.  But the costs and benefits of judicial review 
are difficult to measure with precision.  Reasonable people may ultimately 
disagree with our assessment of other functions’ efficacy and what 
problem-oriented oversight adds to the case they present for judicial review.  
At the least, however, any suggestion to replace Article III review is 
incomplete unless it grapples with how the change would affect the federal 
courts’ capacity to discharge all of the functions they perform, including 
problem-oriented oversight.  
Third, although courts do engage in problem-oriented oversight, 
some do so unevenly.  In certain instances, federal judges have not yet 
addressed problems of internal agency administration that need a response.  
                                                
17 https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC04_NCC_Filed_Appealable.html. 
18 http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C02ASep13.pdf. 
19 E.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 
1635, 1685 (2010). 
20 E.g., Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 679, 725-726 (2002). 
21 E.g., id. at 728. 
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Our description and defense of problem-oriented oversight is an attempt to 
spur courts to execute this function more evenly and aggressively.  Finally, 
problem-oriented oversight is not something exclusive to high volume 
agency adjudication.  Courts have the capacity to perform this function in 
any domain where they review large numbers of decisions made by other 
institutions.22  An appreciation for problem-oriented oversight and how it 
works can improve the contributions to good government that generalist 
judges make in a number of fields.23 
Part I explains why we use immigration and disability benefits 
adjudication as the two exemplar systems we draw upon in this Article.  It 
also gives brief introductions to both, to provide basic background for the 
discussion that follows.  Part II includes an extensive assessment of the 
previously identified functions that the federal courts play when they decide 
appeals from high volume agency adjudicators.  Although our reasons 
differ, we ultimately agree Mashaw’s influential critique; courts cannot 
discharge these functions successfully enough to justify the case for Article 
III involvement in high volume agency adjudication.  In Part III, we define 
problem-oriented oversight and explain how courts engage in it.  We also 
offer a method for data gathering and analysis that courts can use to perform 
the function more rigorously.  Part IV defends problem-oriented oversight 
through judicial review, stressing the federal courts’ institutional advantages 
as reasons why the task suits them.  
I. DISABILITY BENEFITS AND IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATION 
A. The Exemplar Agencies 
 
Federal administrative adjudication comes in many varieties.  
Adjudication by the five ALJs working for the Securities and Exchange 
Commission represents one variant.  They preside over proceedings that 
often last months and resemble civil litigation in Article III courts.24  A 
world apart is a tribunal like the Veterans Administration’s Board of 
Veterans’ Appeals.  Its sixty-one veterans’ law judges decided 41,910 cases 
                                                
22 E.g., Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1022-1023 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring). 
23 For an argument that criminal courts should engage in a version of the oversight we 
describe here, see Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional 
Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016). 
24 Bandimere v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 844 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 2016); Breon 
S. Peace & Elizabeth Vicens, Changes and Challenges in the SEC’s ALJ Proceedings, 
Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Nov. 12, 
2016, at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/12/changes-and-challenges-in-the-secs-
alj-proceedings/. 
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in 2013, or 687 per adjudicator.25  This sort of high volume adjudication 
poses a distinctive set of challenges.  How can large numbers of 
adjudicators administering the same complex regulatory regime decide 
cases consistently?  How can they render high quality decisions without 
allowing a huge backlog of claims to grow?  What ensures that adjudicators, 
worn down by an unending river of cases, do not burn out or become jaded?  
Finally, can these adjudicators make decisions that will withstand federal 
judicial scrutiny?  Should they be forced to do so? 
To assess the contributions federal courts can make to these 
questions’ answers, we draw on the illustrative experiences of the SSA and 
the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(“EOIR”).  A number of federal agencies engage in high volume 
adjudication.  Table 1 lists those agencies whose hearing-level adjudicators 
decide more than one case per workday.26 
 
Table 1.  High Volume Agency Adjudication 
 
Agency Name Number of 
Decisions, FY 
2013 
Number of Agency 
Adjudicators 
Decisions Per 
Adjudicator 
Board of Veterans’ 
Appeals 
41,910 61 687 
Department of 
Agriculture 
Administrative 
Review Branch 
1,258 4 314.5 
Office of Medicare 
Hearings and 
Appeals 
79,377 65 1221.6 
HHS Provider 
Reimbursement 
Board 
1,833 5 366.6 
EOIR 253,942 248 1024 
SSA 793,580 1486 534 
 
We use the EOIR and SSA for several reasons.  First, for a long time 
these agencies have adjudicated more cases than any other.27  A study of 
                                                
25 All data in this Part on case loads and numbers of agency adjudicators come from 
Adjudication Research: Joint Project of ACUS and Stanford Law School, at 
https://acus.law.stanford.edu/. 
26 By “hearing-level” we mean adjudicators who hold merits hearings to gather evidence, 
hear from witnesses, and so forth. 
27 The Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals now has a caseload roughly equal to 
EOIR’s.  This is a recent change, with filings growing 315% between 2010 and 2016.  
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high volume agency adjudication that did not reflect the EOIR’s and SSA’s 
experiences with the federal courts would offer narrow instruction.  Second, 
both of these agencies generate significant numbers of federal court appeals.  
Due to a recent spike, ALJs at the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals 
(“OMHA”) now decide hundreds of thousands of cases each year.  Yet very 
few of the medical service providers contesting a reimbursement decision 
ultimately seek judicial review.  The federal courts received only twenty-
seven appeals from OMHA ALJs in 2016.28  Likewise, veterans appealed 
only 109 cases to the Federal Circuit in FY 2015,29 a year the Board of 
Veterans’ Appeals received 69,957 cases.30  In contrast, social security and 
immigration appeals to the federal courts number in the thousands every 
year.  For an agency like the OMHA, judicial review truly is a mirage.  For 
the SSA and the EOIR, it is a more meaningful component in an overall 
system of adjudication. 
Third, decisions go directly from the SSA and the EOIR to the 
Article III courts, without some other independent tribunal involved as an 
intermediary.  Before veterans can appeal to the Federal Circuit, they first 
must litigate before the Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims (“CAVC”), 
an Article I tribunal independent of the Veterans’ Administration. 31  
Adjudicators at the Internal Revenue Service’s Office of Appeals decide 
more than 40,000 cases each year.  Appeals from their orders go almost 
entirely to the U.S. Tax Court, also an Article I tribunal, before appeals can 
proceed to a federal appellate court.32  No such court stands between the 
EOIR and the courts of appeals, or between the SSA and the district courts, 
to provide an intermediate level of oversight. 
Notwithstanding their distinctive features, lessons from the EOIR’s 
and SSA’s interactions with the federal courts can readily inform critical 
evaluations of other systems of judicial review.  Whether direct oversight 
by Article III courts succeeds should inform judgments of whether an 
Article I intermediary works better, for instance.  Whether Congress should 
raise or reduce amount-in-controversy requirements for OMHA appeals, to 
use another example, should depend at least in part on the desirability of 
                                                                                                                       
OFFICE OF MEDICARE HEARINGS AND APPEALS, FY 2018 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 6 
(2017). 
28 Hosna e-mail, supra note 14. 
29 http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/appeals_filed_terminated_and_pending.pdf. 
30 https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2015AnnualReport.pdf; 
http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2015AR.pdf. 
31 E.g., Michael P. Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran: What the Constitution 
Can Tell Us About the Veterans’ Benefits System, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 505 (2011). 
32 Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More 
Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1196-1197 (2008). 
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judicial review in Article III courts.33  Also, much of what can be learned 
from the interactions between the EOIR and the federal courts, or from 
those between the SSA and the federal courts, does not depend on the 
precise configuration of judicial review that these systems’ designs involve.  
The CAVC, for instance, could engage in the sort of data gathering we 
describe in Part III and use what it assembles to identify and respond to the 
kind of problems we identify. 
B.  A Brief Primer on the SSA and the EOIR 
  
The rest of this Article draws upon the EOIR’s and the SSA’s 
relationships with the federal courts to inform our claims about judicial 
review and the functions it plays in the context of high volume agency 
adjudication.  Both systems have endless complexities, but a basic 
orientation to each should suffice for what follows.   
The EOIR, part of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), 
presently employs about 325 IJs who work in dozens of immigration courts 
scattered around the country.34  Cases can get before IJs in several ways.  
An immigrant who claims to be fleeing persecution can apply for asylum 
with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.  If USCIS rejects her 
application, it will forward her case to an IJ for an asylum hearing.35  
Alternatively, the government might initiate removal proceedings against an 
undocumented immigrant picked up at a work site, or against a non-citizen 
arrested for a crime.  These cases go directly to IJs for adjudication.  The IJ 
holds a hearing and issues a decision on the immigrant’s asylum petition or 
request for cancellation of removal.  If the immigrant loses, she can ask the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), a 16-member appellate tribunal 
located at EOIR’s headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia, to review the IJ’s 
decision.  The immigrant can appeal from an adverse BIA decision to “the 
court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge 
completed the proceedings.”36 
The SSA’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review supervises 
an enormous system of disability benefits adjudication.  A person who 
believes that his impairments prevent him from working applies for 
                                                
33 One of the reasons why so few OMHA decisions get appealed to the federal courts is the 
amount-in-controversy requirement that federal court jurisdiction over these cases includes.  
See Medicare Program; Medicare Appeals; Adjustment to the Amount in Controversy 
Threshold Amounts for Calendar Year 2017, 81 Fed. Reg. 65,651 (Sept. 23, 2016). 
34 https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pr/executive-office-immigration-review-swears-11-
immigration-judges. 
35 https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-
states. 
36 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). 
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disability benefits at one of the SSA’s 1,300 field offices.  If initially 
denied, and if denied again upon reconsideration, the claimant can request a 
hearing before an ALJ.  (From this point on, “ALJ” refers to an SSA ALJ.)  
The ALJ works with about 1,400 judicial colleagues in one of 160 hearing 
offices around the country.  Aided by a “decision writer,” the SSA’s version 
of a law clerk, the ALJ issues a written decision after considering the 
claimant’s medical records, her hearing testimony, and other evidence.  If 
the decision goes against the claimant, he can appeal to the SSA’s Appeals 
Council, located in the same nondescript Falls Church office building.  
After a workup by an “analyst,” who also functions as a law clerk, the case 
goes to one of dozens of appellate adjudicators for a decision.  If the 
claimant loses again, he can appeal to a federal district court, typically the 
one in the district where he resides.37 
II. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Disability benefits adjudication belongs as an exemplar in a study of 
judicial review in part because it has attracted the most exhaustive attention.  
No treatment of SSA decision-making is more important than the landmark 
report Mashaw and his colleagues compiled in 1978.  They identified 
several possible functions that judicial review performs, including the 
following: 
 
• A “corrective function”: courts can correct erroneous agency 
decisions. 
 
• A “regulative function”: courts can induce agency adjudicators to 
decide cases more accurately, either through fear of judicial reversal 
(“the in terrorem effect”) or by forcing them to abide by court-
fashioned rules (“the precedential effect”). 
 
• A “legitimizing function”: review of an agency’s decision by an 
independent judiciary can increase public confidence in the 
legitimacy of outcomes. 
 
• A “critical function”: courts offer agencies a “steady stream” of 
feedback that they can use to improve, and that is valuable for its 
own sake. 
 
                                                
37 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 16-30; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
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• A “public information function”: court decisions “serve as a window 
on an agency whose operations would otherwise be invisible.”38 
 
Primarily assessing the corrective and regulative functions, the Mashaw 
group concluded that judicial review’s benefits for the adjudication of social 
security disability claims did not justify its costs.39  Decades later, this claim 
continues to reverberate in discussions of whether the federal courts should 
review agency adjudication.40 
 The Mashaw group’s discussion remains the most comprehensive 
and trenchant analysis of judicial review of high volume agency 
adjudication.  It thus offers a good template for an inquiry into what 
functions judicial review can serve and how well it can perform them.  
Revisited four decades later, much of the Mashaw group’s skepticism 
remains warranted, and not just for disability benefits adjudication.  What 
follows updates and elaborates on the Mashaw group’s analysis, with a 
focus on judicial review’s error correction, regulative, and critical 
functions.41  In any odd instance the federal courts can discharge one or 
more of these functions well.  But institutional features of courts and 
agencies prompt doubts that the former can do so reliably enough to place 
judicial review of high volume agency adjudication on stable normative 
footing.    
A. The Corrective Function 
 
Plenty of appeals filed in the federal courts involve mistakes made 
by agency adjudicators.  To think otherwise requires unwarranted 
confidence in the internal agency appellate tribunals that stand between 
first-line adjudicators and the federal courts.  Year after year, the SSA 
requests a voluntary remand in about 15% of cases appealed to the federal 
courts.42  These “RVRs” happen only when an SSA lawyer and the Appeals 
Council conclude that the lawyer cannot defend the ALJ’s decision as 
compliant with the agency’s own view of social security law and policy.43  
Disability appeals go to the federal courts only after Appeals Council 
review, so RVRs amount to a concession that internal appellate review 
sometimes fails.   
                                                
38 MASHAW ET AL., supra note 15 at 136-137. 
39 Id. at 146-147. 
40 E.g., Bagley, supra note 15. 
41 Legitimacy, public information functions discussion. 
42 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 31. 
43 Id. at 32. 
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Errors surely remain for the federal courts to correct, and federal 
courts surely correct errors.  But the Mashaw group doubted that courts can 
do so reliably.  We disagree.  Nonetheless, the opportunity cost of court-
based error correction unsettles its contribution to the case for judicial 
review.  
1. The Baseline Problem 
 
The Mashaw group questioned the capacity of courts to correct 
errors because of doubts that judges could evaluate disability claims as 
accurately as ALJs.44  The problem involves a contrast between courts’ and 
ALJs’ baselines.  ALJs handle a much larger caseload than federal judges, 
and ALJs get their cases earlier in the adjudication process.  ALJs thus see a 
wider array of types of claims than federal judges do.45  Moreover, the 
government cannot appeal, so claimants pick all of the cases that go to 
federal court.  An ALJ may therefore have a different “cutpoint”46 – 
roughly, the line the ALJ would draw along a given dimension between 
disability and no disability – than a federal court for a decision in favor of 
the claimant.  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate.  
 
 
                                                
44 MASHAW ET AL., supra note 38 at 138-139.   
45 For analogous information about immigration appeals, see Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1649 n.64 (2010). 
46 Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 483 (2011). 
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Most appeals presumably come from the groups of correct and 
erroneous denials of what we call “difficult claims.”  Bereft of a more 
diverse baseline, a federal judge might view what to the ALJ was a 
relatively weak claim for benefits as an above-average one.47  “If federal 
judges saw more of what ALJs grant,” this ALJ told us, “they would 
appreciate why a case seems more borderline to an ALJ.”48 
The baseline problem can manifest itself in more granular ways.  A 
federal judge might react differently than an agency adjudicator to particular 
evidence, for instance.  With their immense caseloads, ALJs and decision 
writers can see letters from the same physicians that use the same phrases to 
describe patients with strikingly similar problems.49  “We know which 
doctors are trustworthy and which ones aren’t,” one ALJ told us, “but we 
can’t put this in a decision.”50  Likewise, another ALJ said, claimants can 
testify in an obviously coached manner, taught to say just the right thing to 
buttress a claim for benefits.51  IJs may experience the same phenomenon.52  
An ALJ or IJ might correctly discount such evidence, but a federal judge 
with a narrower evidentiary baseline might fault the ALJ for doing so. 
Federal judges have countervailing institutional advantages, 
however, that may exceed whatever edge a richer baseline gives ALJs.  
Perhaps most importantly, courts can invest more time and resources in 
decision-making than agency adjudicators can.  To keep backlogs at bay, 
the SSA asks its ALJs to decide between 500-700 cases per year,53 with 
each involving hundreds of pages of medical records and a complex 
regulatory regime.  This caseload is “preposterous,” as one district judge 
described it.54  ALJs spend about two-and-a-half hours total on all aspects 
                                                
47 MASHAW ET AL., supra note 38 at 139. 
48 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 77. 
49 Id. at 77-78. 
50 Id. at 78; see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 832 (9th Cir. 1995). 
51 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 78. 
52 Cf. Jeff Chorney, 9th Cir. Slaps ‘Incomprehensible Ruling’, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 21, 2005 
(quoting an immigration judge as insisting that arguments from asylum applicants “‘were 
all the same’”). 
53 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 36. 
54 Id. at 73 n.404; see also Alex M. Parker, Recession is Exacerbating Social Security 
Claims Backlog, Panelists Say, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, May 28, 2009 (quoting a district judge 
describing ALJ workloads as “unconscionable”), at 
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of a case, and decision writers an additional eight hours when drafting a 
decision denying a claim.55  A case gets about four hours of analyst time at 
the SSA’s Appeals Council, appellate adjudicators decide 5-12 cases per 
day.56   
With 1,000 cases to decide each year, IJs face an even more 
herculean task.57  BIA review practices have changed considerably over the 
last fifteen years, but their nadir, caseloads gave board members only 7-10 
minutes for the average case. 58   Federal judges have more time to 
deliberate.59  In FY 2014, when on average a single IJ had more than 1,400 
matters on his docket,60 the entire federal appellate bench received 54,988 
filings.61  Given the governing law’s endless details and the often sizable 
case files assembled before agency adjudicators, the sheer amount of time a 
federal judge might spend compared to an ALJ or IJ can compensate for the 
narrower baseline.   
Another institutional advantage adds to the courts’ side of the 
ledger.  The decision writer-to-ALJ ratio is 1:1,62 for instance, and the law 
clerk-to-IJ ratio is 1:4.63  District judges have at least two clerks, and court 
of appeals judges typically have four.  
Agency adjudicators’ baselines may give them a better sense of the 
overall disability landscape than what federal judges enjoy.  But the time 
and resource shortfalls that afflict agency decision-making may make its 
adjudicators more error-prone, while federal judges’ comparative surfeit of 
both improves their relative capacity to decide cases accurately.  How these 
advantages and disadvantages balance out is not obvious in the abstract.  
Not long ago, however, the SSA’s Chief ALJ conceded that it favors the 
                                                                                                                       
www.govexec.com/oversight/2009/05/recession-is-exacerbating-social-security-claims-
backlog-panelists-say/29262/. 
55 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 14.  
56 Id. at 29. 
57 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, REDUCING THE IMMIGRATION COURT BACKLOG AND DELAYS 5 
(2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, MANAGEMENT OF 
IMMIGRATION CASES AND APPEALS BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 
1-2 (2012). 
58 Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2007). 
59 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 73. 
60 See American Immigration Council, Fact Sheet, Empty Benches: Underfunding of 
Immigration Courts Undermines Justice, June 17, 2016, at 
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/empty-benches-underfunding-
immigration-courts-undermines-justice. 
61 U.S. Courts of Appeals – Judicial Business 2014, at www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2014.  During a several year period in the mid-
2000s, the Second and Ninth Circuits lost their time advantage over IJs and the BIA for 
immigration cases.  But a return of immigration appeals to lower levels has restored it.   
62 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 74. 
63 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 57 at 5 n.41. 
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federal courts, observing that “most of our decisions that are remanded or 
reversed by the federal judges are remanded or reversed simply because our 
decision did not comply with our own policy.”64 Although the SSA has 
embarked upon an extensive program of quality improvement since these 
comments, the composition of the pool of federal court appeals probably 
has not changed all that much since that time, as we argue at length in our 
report.65  Federal judges can probably identify flawed decisions fairly 
accurately.  The same is likely true of immigration appeals, at least for the 
cases that the federal courts remand to the agency.66 
2. The Costs of Mistakes 
 
Whatever the frequency, surely federal judges err and incorrectly 
remand cases from time to time.  The error correction function cannot 
justify judicial review if judges make costly mistakes.  Suppose a judge is 
right eight times out of ten when she remands a case to the agency.  Judicial 
review would prove harmful on balance if the costs of the false positives 
(the two erroneous remands) exceed the benefits of the true positives (the 
eight correct ones). 
The cost-benefit balance resists an easy assessment in part because 
the social value and harms of wrongfully made disability payments and of 
payments wrongfully withheld cannot really be measured.67  One estimate 
holds that the wrongful allowance of benefits from 2005-2014 will 
ultimately cost the federal treasury $72 billion.68  On the other side of the 
ledger is an actually disabled claimant whose impairments make a correct 
decision on her claim “‘a matter of life and death.’”69  How does the social 
value of a true positive compare to the costs of false positives?   
Any estimate of this balance must necessarily be crude.  But one 
guess suggests that the benefits of true positives basically equal the costs of 
false positives in the aggregate, at least for social security adjudication, 
                                                
64 Letter from Frank A. Cristaudo, Chief Administrative Law Judge, to Colleagues, Dec. 
19, 2007, at 3 (on file with authors) 
65 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 54. 
66 The federal courts remand many fewer immigration cases, percentage-wise, than social 
security appeals.  Their prerogative to review IJ decisions is narrower than what they enjoy 
for social security cases. We thus presume that, when a federal court remands an 
immigration court decision, the likelihood that it is indeed flawed is very high. 
67 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative 
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976). 
68 David H. Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the United States: 
Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options, Nov. 23, 2011, at 4, at 
http://economics.mit.edu/files/6880. 
69 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 15 (quoting a claimant representative). 
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where the likelihood and costs of false positives relative to other categories 
of high volume agency adjudication are highest. 70   A claimant who 
successfully obtains benefits can expect to receive about $1,150 in cash per 
month.71  In 2007, the Government Accountability Office determined that 
SSA ALJs eventually grant benefits to 66% of claimants who secure a court 
remand.72  We used these numbers together with a range of assumptions 
about benefits wrongly provided, the costs associated with ALJ time spent 
on court remands, 73  the social value of dollars received by disability 
beneficiaries, and the social costs of raising the tax revenue needed to pay 
for benefits and the operation of the judicial review system, to conduct a 
back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Our calculations yield 
two key conclusions. First, using what we regard as reasonable values of the 
key normative and positive parameters, we find that the net social value of 
judicial review of disability appeals is likely within $10 million of zero. 
Second, even with extreme assumptions in either direction, the net social 
value or cost of judicial review seems very unlikely to be more than a drop 
in the bucket when measured relative to the overall magnitude of disability 
                                                
70 While we lack equivalent numbers, we are confident that this balance comes out in favor 
of judicial review for immigration adjudication as well.  For one thing, the federal courts 
rule very infrequently in favor of immigrants.  The circuits upheld agency decisions in 
88.7% of cases in 2016.  John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for December 2015 
and Calendar Year 2015 Totals, 10 IMMIG. LAW ADVISOR 3 (2016).  Given these numbers, 
the 11.3% of cases immigrants win should involve fairly egregious agency errors.  
Moreover, the harms that result from a false positive – a decision reversing the BIA when 
the immigrant should be removed or denied asylum – should be fairly low.  Immigrants 
who are ordered deported based on their criminal activity almost never prevail on appeal.  
Only an immigrant who has no criminal record, and thus presents no indication of a threat 
to public safety, is likely to prevail erroneously. 
71 This figure refers to a claimant seeking SSDI benefits, not SSI benefits.  Testimony of 
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Regarding 
Oversight of Federal Disability Programs, Before the Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, June 11, 2014.  This figure does not include the 
value of Medicare coverage that a beneficiary would also receive. 
72 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, 
DISABILITY PROGRAMS: SSA HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ADDRESS CONFLICTING COURT 
DECISIONS, BUT NEEDS TO MANAGE DATA BETTER ON THE INCREASING NUMBER OF 
COURT REMANDS, Apr. 2007, at 16. 
73 In FY 2015, federal courts remanded about 8,800 cases to the SSA.  We use this data and 
the following assumptions: (1) One-fourth of the 66% of court remands that result in the 
payment of benefits do so because ALJs want to get rid of troublesome cases, not because 
the claimant is actually disabled; (2) one-half of the 34% of court remands that do not 
result in the payment of benefits fail because the federal judge erred, with the other half of 
remands that do not result in benefit payment being true negatives, i.e., correct denials of 
benefits; and (3) court remands are more difficult than cases heard in the first instance, 
such that an average ALJ could decide a dozen new cases during the time required to 
decide court remands.  See GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 48 & n.291. 
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(and federal court) expenditures—almost surely about less than a tenth of a 
penny for every dollar spent on these programs.74   
                                                
74 Here we define the benefits as benefits paid to claimants who should receive them.  In 
FY 2015, courts remanded 8800 cases to the agency.  Assuming that ALJs paid benefits to 
49.5% of these claimants correctly (three-fourths of the 66% of claimants who won 
benefits), judicial review creates an annual benefit of $60,112,800 in benefits rightly paid 
to people with disabilities. We let the social value of paying a dollar in benefits to an 
eligible claimant be α dollars. For example, if α=2, then the social value of providing a 
dollar to an eligible beneficiary is as good as providing two dollars to a randomly drawn 
member of the remainder of the population. Thus the benefit side of having judicial review 
is $60,112,800 times α. 
 The costs of judicial review include ALJ resources that have to be spent on court 
remands as well as those federal judicial resources spent handling disability appeals.  As 
far as ALJ resources go, each court remand displaces two cases an ALJ could decide in the 
first instance.  Thus, the 8,800 remands from federal court in FY 2015 displaced 17,600 
first-instance remands. In FY 2015, 1,530 ALJs decided 507,883 cases,  
https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY17Files/2017KT.pdf at page 75 and Table 3.34, for an 
average of roughly 332 cases decided per ALJ.  At that rate, it would take 53 ALJs to 
decide 17,600 first-instance cases. In 2015, the average ALJ’s salary was $159,156.65.  
https://www.federalpay.org/employees/occupations/administrative-law-judge.  Assuming 
the cost of fringe benefits is an additional 20%, the total cost to the SSA in 2015 of court 
remands, measured in terms of ALJ productivity, is 53×1.2×$159,156.65, which amounts 
to $10,122,362.94. Assuming that the cost of decision writers and other support staff for 
the 53 ALJ-equivalents would amount to another 50 percent of this figure yields a total 
SSA staff cost of 1.5×$10,122,362.94, or $15,183,544.  
 With respect to judicial resources, the 19,222 disability cases terminated in the 12 
months ending June 30, 2015, see 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/c04jun15_0.pdf, amounted to 7% of civil 
terminations. Assuming these cases would require 7% of the work time of 630 district court 
judges (663 permanent authorized and 10 temporary authorized, see 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/allauth.pdf, less 43 vacancies, see 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-
vacancies/2015/06/summary), which is high since these cases don’t go to trial or involve 
intensive pre-trial wrangling, these cases account for the work time of roughly 44 federal 
judges. According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts FY2017 Congressional 
Budget Summary, filling an Article III judgeship costs $233,333.33, see 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fy_2017_federal_judiciary_congressional_budg
et_summary_0.pdf at 24 (item 3: $1.4 million to fill 6 judgeships), plus an additional 
$140,000 for each of five staff members (id. at 25, item 7: $4.2 million for 30 associated 
staffers). The total including support staff is thus $933,333.33 per judge, or $41,066,667 
for the 44 additional federal judges.  
Adding that figure to the SSA staff cost of $15,183,544 calculated above yields a 
total government staff cost of $56,250,211. In addition, the SSA must pay some of 
claimants’ litigation costs under the EAJA; in 2015 these costs amounted to $38,132,381, 
so the total government staff cost and fee-shifting expenses come to $94,382,592. 
Government staff must be paid out of tax revenues. Because taxes affect behavior, the 
social costs of raising a dollar of tax revenue exceeds one dollar. See ___ for a discussion 
of this issue in the public economics literature. To account for this issue, we let β be the 
social cost of raising a dollar of tax revenue, so that under our assumptions the total social 
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3. The Opportunity Cost 
 
Another way to look at error correction is to consider whether the 
resources it consumes could be spent in alternative ways.  On this view, the 
                                                                                                                       
cost of government staff work related to judicial review of disability appeals is 
$94,382,592×β. 
So far we have a total social value of $60,112,800×𝛼 and a total social cost 
associated with government staffing equal to $94,382,592×β. The difference will be 
marginally positive if 𝛼 > 𝛽, i.e., if the social value of transferring a dollar to persons truly 
entitled to receive disability benefits exceeds the marginal cost of raising a dollar in taxes. 
We think this assumption is reasonable, though of course the value of 𝛼 is fundamentally a 
normative question.  
There is also the question of how to account for benefits erroneously paid to those 
not actually entitled to them under the law. Under our assumption above, benefits would 
have been wrongly paid to 16.5% (one-quarter of 66%) of the 8,800 claimants who won 
remands in FY 2015, which amounts to $20,037,600 in benefits wrongly paid.  One 
approach would be to regard these paid-out benefits as having a net social cost of 
$20,037,600×β, since taxes must be raised to fund these benefits.  But that approach fails 
to recognize that (i) these benefits have some value to those who receive them, and (ii) the 
well-being of such recipients has some social value. Presumably the social value of 
transferring a dollar in disability benefits to those not actually entitled under the law is less 
than the value of transferring a dollar to those who are eligible, in which case the 
appropriate value of a dollar of such transfer is 𝛼𝜆, where 𝜆 < 1. Thus the net social value 
impact of erroneous benefit payments is $20,037,600×(αλ − β), which is positive if 𝜆 is 
close enough to 1, negative otherwise, and, finally, is never worse in social cost-benefit 
terms than −$20,037,600×β.  
Our final cost-benefit formula is $60,112,800×𝛼 − $94,382,592×β +
$20,037,600×(αλ − β), which, after some algebra, may be written as $114,420,192×
𝛼 − β − $54,307,392×𝛼 + $20,037,600×αλ. If we assume that 𝛼 = 2, 𝛽 = 1.4, and 
𝜆 = 0.5 (so that a dollar of disability benefits paid to an ineligible person who is 
erroneously granted benefits on appeal has a social value of 50 cents), then the net social 
value is a loss of roughly $20 million. Raising the value of 𝜆 to 1 would yield a net social 
value that is roughly a wash. Reducing the value of 𝜆 to 0 instead yields a net social value 
that is a loss of roughly $40 million. If we totally ignored the social costs related to judicial 
review—i.e., set 𝛽 to 0—and assumed 𝜆 = 1, we would obtain a social value that is a gain 
of about $160 million. If instead we kept the assumption of β=1.4 but totally ignored the 
social benefits—i.e., set α to 0—we would obtain a social value that is a loss of about 
$160 million. 
This discussion shows that even with relatively extreme assumptions about the 
parameter values necessary to measure the social costs and benefits of judicial review, the 
net social gain or loss would be on the order of only about $100-200 million. That might 
sound like a lot of money, but it is a drop in the bucket in the context of the disability 
programs; SSDI alone accounted for $147 billion in spending in 2015. See Table II.B1.—
Summary of 2015 Trust Fund Financial Operations, at 
https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2016/II_B_cyoper.html#96807. Thus even our extreme 
assumptions yield net social gains or losses from judicial review of less than a tenth of a 
percent of the disability programs’ overall spending. Our more reasonable assumptions 
yield estimates whose magnitudes are rounding error in the budgetary context. 
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limitations of the error correction function lie not only with the difficulties 
judges have identifying errors, nor only with the harms that false positives 
cause, but rather with judicial review’s opportunity cost.  If invested in 
agency adjudication, the resources that judicial review requires might lead 
to fewer errors made in the first instance. 
Any adjudication system should prefer error avoidance to error 
correction, all else equal.  An acquittal or dismissal obviously compares 
favorably to a conviction that later gets vacated on appeal.  If the system’s 
designer has $100 to spend, and if that sum can either avoid one error or 
correct one error, the designer should invest in error avoidance rather than 
error correction.  Judicial review makes sense from this perspective only if 
the $100 can buy more error correction than error avoidance. 
For social security claims, the return on investment probably comes 
out in favor of error avoidance rather than error correction.  At a minimum, 
resources expended on judicial review include salaries for the SSA litigators 
who brief and argue cases, Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) fees paid 
to claimants’ lawyers when their clients prevail,75 and the cost of federal 
judge time.  In FY 2015, these resources funded a system of judicial review 
that corrected a maximum of about six-and-a-half errors per ALJ.76  The 
SSA paid $38,132,381.48 in EAJA fees in FY 2015.  This amount equals 
the salaries of about 240 ALJs, or 18% of their total number.77  If spent on 
ALJs instead, this money alone could increase the ALJ corps by 18% and 
thereby enable the SSA to lower per capita case completion goals without 
increasing the backlog of undecided cases.  If a lightened load led to even a 
modest improvement in decisional accuracy, i.e., seven fewer errors per 
ALJ,78 then the resources spent on judicial review would yield fewer errors 
if redirected to error avoidance.79 
                                                
75 On EAJA fees, see GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 55. 
76 In FY 2013, the country’s 1,356 ALJs rendered 458,869 appealable decisions.  In FY 
2015, the federal courts remanded 8,646 cases, or 6.4 remands per ALJ.  For data, see 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2014/supplement14.pdf, Table 2.F; 
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC01_RR_Appealable_HO_Dispositions.html; 
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC05_Court_Remands_NCC_Filed.html.  For the 
purposes of this calculation, we assume that an ALJ decision issued in 2013 will get 
reviewed, if at all, by a federal judge in 2015. 
77 For EAJA fees, see Social Security Administration, Equal Access to Justice Act 
Payments, at www.ssa.gov/open/data/EAJA.html.  For ALJ salaries, see 
www.federalpay.org/employees/occupations/administrative-law-judge. 
78 On the relationship between quality and quantity, see, e.g., GELBACH & MARCUS, supra 
note 16 at 72-73. 
79 The math comes out the same way for immigration adjudication.  In 2015, the federal 
courts of appeals decided 250 cases in favor of immigrants – about one per IJ.  John 
Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for December 2015 and Calendar Year 2015 
Totals, 10 IMMIG. LAW ADVISOR 5, 6 (2016).  For information on the number of IJs during 
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This case for error avoidance rests on the assumption that the federal 
courts currently correct only a modest number of errors.  If the number 
rises, the argument for an investment in error correction strengthens.  In 
theory, Congress can control this number by resetting jurisdictional 
requirements and the federal courts’ standard of review.  It thereby could 
adjust the flow of cases to the federal courts.  An endogeneity problem 
seems to exist.  Whether Congress should increase the flow of cases to the 
federal courts depends on the value of the courts’ error correction function.  
But the value of error correction depends on where Congress sets the dial, 
to control the flow of cases to the federal courts.  Also, very importantly, 
claimants’ behavior might be different earlier in the process if there were no 
judicial review. For example, some claimants might not pursue appeals at 
earlier stages if they knew there was no possible appeal to the federal 
courts, and they might have greater difficulty obtaining legal representation. 
Other determinants of the bang for each buck invested in error 
correction, however, are exogenous.  They depend on immutable 
institutional factors that constrain the federal courts’ overall capacity to 
review agency decisions.  Even under conditions that should prompt the 
most appeals, the federal courts receive few relative to the agency’s 
caseload.  In 2002, for example, the U.S. Attorney General announced 
changes to BIA processes to expedite agency review of IJ decisions.  Many 
believe that these “streamlining” changes degraded the BIA’s review 
considerably by reducing the scrutiny it afforded IJ decisions.80  BIA 
remands plummeted, 81  even as IJ decisional quality earned scathing 
criticism.82  Cases flooded the courts of appeals,83 rising from 1,760 in 2001 
to 12,349 in 2005.84  But even at the surge’s peak, only about 5% of IJ 
decisions produced a federal court appeal.85   
Attorney incentives are one such institutional factor that limits the 
federal courts’ docket, regardless of where Congress sets the dial.  
Immigration and social security lawyers prefer to litigate before agency 
                                                                                                                       
2015, see Joshua Breisblat, Despite Immigration Judge Hiring, Court Backlogs Continue to 
Grow, July 27, 2016, at http://immigrationimpact.com/2016/07/27/despite-immigration-
judge-hiring-court-backlogs-continue-grow/. 
80 E.g., Stacy Caplow, After the Flood: The Legacy of the “Surge” of Federal Immigration 
Appeals, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 4-6 (2012). 
81 Legomsky, supra note 45 at 1669. 
82 E.g., Benslimane v. Ashcroft, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005). 
83 Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1122-1126 (2011). 
84 Caplow, supra note 80 at 1-2.   
85 In FY 2003 IJs decided 250,823 matters.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK C4 (2007).  In 2005, immigrants 
filed 12,349 appeals from BIA decisions.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS 2005 15 (2006). 
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adjudicators rather than the federal courts.  Disability and immigration cases 
generate only modest fees, so social security and immigration specialists 
often must have high volume practices.86  For most lawyers, a federal court 
appeal takes much more time than an appearance before an IJ or ALJ.87  
Immigration lawyers typically represent clients for a flat fee, 88  an 
arrangement that should steer them toward less time intensive work (i.e., 
litigating in immigration court) than more (writing an appellate brief).  
Lawyers who represent social security claimants likewise have a strong 
economic incentive to prefer agency work.89  True, poor quality agency 
adjudication in some hearing offices may deepen the pool of potentially 
good appeals and make court work more attractive to lawyers.90  But as 
long as lawyers can earn more litigating before IJs or ALJs, the supply of 
lawyers available to litigate federal court appeals in the areas where agency 
decision-making suffers may be insufficiently elastic to pick up the slack. 
Attrition is perhaps an even more powerful institutional barrier to 
federal court.  The extended process of adjudication and review within the 
agency can cause even those with meritorious appeals to give up before 
they reach the federal courts.  By the time she can file an appeal in federal 
court, a disability benefits claimant may well have already spent more than 
1,000 days pursuing her claim.91  Although the time can vary considerably, 
an immigrant’s case can easily languish for more than 1,000 days before an 
IJ and the BIA complete their review.92  Beyond the time involved, carrots 
or sticks available to the agency can incentivize claimants or immigrants to 
                                                
86 Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 985 
(2015). 
87 E.g., John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of 
Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court?  An Empirical Analysis of the Recent 
Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 1, 88 (2005); GELBACH & MARCUS, 
supra note 16 at 55 & n.321. 
88 E.g., David Gialanella, The Skinny on Flat Fees, 94 A.B.A.J. 26, 26 (2008). 
89 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at at 55 n.321. 
90 Palmer et al., supra note 87 at 88-89. 
91 In FY 2015, the average processing time for a claim’s determination at the initial level 
was 114 days.  Reconsideration took 113 days on average, and a claim languished for 480 
days before an ALJ’s decision.  SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL 
PERFORMANCE REPORT, 2015-2017, at 26.  Appeals Council review took on average 386 
days.  See Social Security Administration, Appeals Council Requests for Review, Average 
Processing Time, at www.ssa.gov/open/data/Appeals-Council-Avg-Proc-Time.html. 
92 In 2015, the average case languished for 504 days before an IJ decided it.  Immigration 
Court Processing Time by Outcome, at 
www.trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog_proctime_outcome.php.  We could 
not find 2015 data for the BIA.  In 2012, the BIA took an average of 485 days to decide an 
appeal filed by a non-detained immigrant.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, MANAGEMENT OF IMMIGRATION CASES AND APPEALS BY THE 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 43 (2012). 
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forego an appeal.  Prolonged detention encourages immigrants to eschew 
appeals and accept removal, presumably to end the misery of 
incarceration.93  The SSA allows a previously denied claimant to file a new 
disability claim based upon a worsening of her condition, but she must 
abandon any pending appeal to do so.94  
Finally, the federal courts’ limited capacity to decide appeals in a 
manner consistent with deliberative judicial practice may ultimately impose 
an upper limit on how many cases they attract.  As filings increase, judicial 
processes may change to such an extent that they increasingly resemble the 
fast, truncated adjudication that ALJs and IJs provide.95  The Ninth Circuit 
bore the brunt of the surge in immigration appeals after the BIA 
streamlining changes.96  Starting in 2002, it made aggressive use of a case 
screening process that ultimately routed sixty percent of immigration cases 
to staff attorneys for a quick workup, followed by a brief oral presentation 
of each case to a screening panel of judges.  These judges, who typically did 
not review any materials in advance, decided 100-150 cases based on these 
presentations over a 2-3 day period.97  The rate at which immigrants 
prevailed appears to have fallen sharply between 2002 and 2006.98  Perhaps 
                                                
93 E.g., BANKS MILLER ET AL., IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND U.S. ASYLUM POLICY 131-132 
(2015) (finding that detained immigrants “are much less likely to appeal”). 
94 Soc. Sec. Ruling 11-1p. 
95 E.g., GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 121-122; see also Robert A. Katzmann, The 
Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 
6 (2008). 
96 Huang, supra note 83 at 1123-1124. 
97 Anna O. Law, The Ninth Circuit’s Internal Adjudicative Procedures and Their Effect on 
Pro Se and Asylum Appeals, 25 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 647, 673-676 (2011); see also Michael 
Kagan et al., Buying Time? False Assumptions About Abusive Appeals, 63 CATH. U.L. REV. 
679, 702-705 (2014). 
98 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts provides termination data on 
“administrative appeals” and does not isolate immigration cases more specifically.  During 
the time period of the surge, however, almost all of the change in the number of 
administrative appeals came from changes to the number of immigration cases appealed.  
E.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 12-13 (2005).  The 
following table includes the percentage of administrative appeals the Ninth Circuit either 
reversed or remanded, out of the total number of administrative appeal terminations: 
 
Year Reversal/Remand 
Rate 
2002 11% 
2003 9.3% 
2004 6.1% 
2005 6.6% 
2006 1.3% 
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this assembly line character dissuaded some appeals, as lawyers came to 
identify less of a difference between agency and court adjudication and 
perceived that increasing caseloads prompt courts to defer more to the 
agency’s decisions.99   
B. The Regulatory and Critical Functions 
 
The opportunity cost problem weakens the contribution that the 
error correction function can make to the case for judicial review.  But if 
courts not only correct errors but also induce agency adjudicators to avoid 
more in the first place, then its claim to cost effectiveness strengthens.  The 
Mashaw group suggested several ways by which court remands might play 
such a regulative or critical function.  Judicial review might have an in 
terrorem effect on agency adjudication,100 adjudicators might follow rules 
courts fashion, or an agency might use information gleaned from court 
remands to improve.  As before, however, institutional determinants 
interfere with each of these possibilities. 
1. The In Terrorem Effect 
 
An ALJ or an IJ focused on numbers alone has almost no reason to  
change her approach to decision-making just because a federal judge might 
reverse her.  Only 2-3% of ALJ decisions denying benefits produce a 
federal court remand.101  The rate for IJs is even lower.102  Another way to 
put it is to recall that federal courts remand roughly six cases per ALJ per 
                                                                                                                       
Data come from Table B-5 of the Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, 2002-2006.  These 
tables are available at www.uscourts.gov. 
99 Cf. Huang, supra note 83 at 1111-1112. 
100 See also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 527 (1989). 
101 In FY 2013, ALJs issued 458,869 appealable decisions.  See Appeals to the AC as a 
Percentage of Appealable Hearing Level Dispositions, at 
www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC01_RR_Appealable_HO_Dispositions.html.  In FY 
2015, the federal courts remanded 8,646 cases.  Court Remands as a Percentage of New 
Court Cases Filed, at 
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC05_Court_Remands_NCC_Filed.html. 
102 In 2015, the courts of appeals reversed the BIA 250 times.  See supra n.79.  During FY 
2013, immigration judges ordered removal in 95,838 removal proceedings.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIG. REV., FY 2015 STATISTICS YEARBOOK C2 (2016).  This 
figure does not account for the IJ decisions in asylum cases.  So the chances of an 
immigrant losing before an IJ, but eventually winning at a federal court of appeal, is less 
than .2%.  
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year, whereas ALJs adjudicate about 540 claims per year.103  Of course, 
agency adjudicators may vest outsized stock in the federal courts’ opinions 
of their work.  When ALJs sued to challenge the expectation that each 
decide 500-700 cases per year a threat to their decisional independence, for 
example, their complaint alleged that the slipshod work this case 
completion goal required “injured” them because it “demeaned” them “in 
the eyes of the federal judiciary.”104  To be taken seriously by Article III 
judges as black-robed colleagues might matter more to agency adjudicators 
than the odd remand here and there.  Thus the threat of federal court review 
might alter their decision-making.105  
 But federal judge criticism may just as plausibly encourage 
indifference or hostility among agency adjudicators.  For our report, we 
interviewed ALJs who work in a hearing office that generates few remands 
and ALJs from a hearing office that generates a lot of remands.  The former 
reported much more positive views of federal court decision-making and 
commented on the instructional value of court remands; indeed, these ALJs 
prepare and circulate semi-annual memoranda summarizing all decisions 
from the district court to which most of their cases go.106  In contrast, ALJs 
in the high remand district complained that district judges have little 
understanding of or regard for agency processes and expressed no 
appreciation for district court feedback.  The hearing offices there lack any 
sort of structured process that would internalize learning from district court 
opinions.107      
2. The Precedential Effect 
 
Any in terrorem effect or lack thereof is less significant if a court  
can impose precedent on the agency that forces it to improve.  This 
“precedential effect” has long attracted criticism on grounds that generalist 
courts lack the requisite expertise and perspective to forge useful legal 
changes to a complex regulatory regime.108  We take as a given the 
                                                
103 HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, STATISTICAL APPENDIX ON ACHIEVING GREATER 
CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND 
SUGGESTED REFORMS 6 (2013).   
104 Complaint, Association of Administrative Law Judges v. Colvin, N.D. Ill., Civ. No. 13-
2925, Apr. 18, 2013, at 27. 
105 E.g., Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the 
National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIG. 
L.J. 57, 70 (2008). 
106 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 119-120. 
107 Id. at 121. 
108 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) versus Litigation (Courts): An Analytical 
Framework, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND 
LAW 11, 20 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2011).  
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proposition that judges can craft wise opinions for these areas of law, a 
proposition that is necessary but not sufficient for the precedential effect to 
function.  Regardless of this proposition, however, institutional features and 
incentives can render the actual effect of precedent on agency decision-
making questionable for high volume adjudication. 
First, reviewing courts might not have a lot of precedent-setting 
authority.  This is clearly true when appeals first go to the federal district 
courts, whose decisions agencies can ignore as non-precedential.  It can also 
be true when courts of appeals review agency decisions, because an agency 
can narrow the range of issues for which the court can issue binding 
precedent.  If an internal appellate tribunal issues an opinion that resolves 
an unsettled interpretive issue, as the full BIA does routinely,109 courts must 
extend the decision deference if it meets certain criteria of 
authoritativeness.110  An agency can control the lawmaking terrain even 
more completely by issuing legislative rules.111  
 Second, agencies can resist control by judicial precedent when it 
does issue.  Whether an agency can formally do so poses a complicated 
question, although the answer is probably no.  To a greater or lesser degree, 
a number of agencies at one time or another have asserted a policy of 
“nonacquiescence,” whereby they reserve the right to treat appellate case 
law as nonbinding.112  “Intercircuit nonacquiescence,” by which precedent 
binds adjudicators only within a circuit’s boundaries, is routine.113  This 
practice necessarily weakens the power of judicial review to regulate 
agency behavior,114 but no more than how circuit boundaries limit the force 
of any precedent.  The Fourth Circuit cannot compel ALJs in Pasadena to 
follow its interpretation of the Social Security Act, but neither can the 
Fourth Circuit demand that police officers in Pasadena honor its 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment.  The Supreme Court has never 
ruled on “intracircuit nonacquiescence,” the more problematic variant, 
whereby an agency denies that appellate precedent binds its decision-
                                                
109 For all BIA precedent decisions, see www.justice.gov/eoir/ag-bia-decisions. 
110 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); see also United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-227 (2001).  But see Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (holding that single-member BIA decisions do not warrant deference). 
111 E.g., Revisions to the Rule Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 
5844 (Jan. 18, 2017); ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, SSA 
DISABILITY BENEFITS PROGRAMS: ASSESSING THE EFFICACY OF THE TREATING PHYSICIAN 
RULE 7-10 (2013).   
112 E.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 692-718 (1989). 
113 E.g., Matter of Singh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 670, 671-672 (B.I.A. Jan. 19, 2012). 
114 See generally Robert J. Hume, The Limits of Precedent: Agency Nonacquiescence in 
Federal Immigration Cases, at ____. 
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making even within that circuit’s boundaries.  The lower federal courts have 
uniformly condemned the practice,115 and neither the EOIR nor the SSA 
currently practices intracircuit nonacquiescence, at least formally.116   
But acquiescence in judicial precedent does not necessarily happen 
automatically within an agency.  The agency typically has a process to 
digest case law, one that, whether intentionally or unintentionally, can blunt 
the precedent’s force.  When a court of appeals issues a published opinion 
that goes against the government in an immigration case, the EOIR’s Office 
of General Counsel must coordinate the agency’s response with the DOJ’s 
Office of Immigration Litigation and its own Office of the Chief 
Immigration Judge.117  This “difficult” process presumably can delay the 
opinion’s effect on IJ adjudication.118 
Something more than the unavoidable difficulty of bureaucratic 
coordination seems afoot in the SSA.  Since 1985, the agency has required 
all ALJs within a circuit to follow that circuit’s precedent.119  But ALJs do 
not simply read opinions on their own and decide whether and how a court 
has tweaked agency policy.  The SSA instructs ALJs to ignore circuit 
decisions until the agency has determined that the decision conflicts with 
agency policy.  Only then does the SSA issue an “acquiescence ruling” that 
directs ALJs to comply.120  This threshold can cloak a de facto policy of 
intracircuit nonacquiescence.  The agency can soft-pedal differences 
between precedent and its own policy, insisting that no conflict exists, and 
thereby instruct ALJs to ignore court decisions.  The Fourth Circuit, for 
example, requires an ALJ to give “substantial weight” to the Veterans 
Administration’s disability determination when a claimant with prior 
military service seeks social security benefits.  The social security ruling on 
the subject requires that the VA’s determination “cannot be ignored and 
must be considered,” an obligation that on its face seems weaker.121  But the 
SSA has not issued an acquiescence ruling for the Fourth Circuit’s opinion.  
In fact, the agency has issued just over eighty acquiescence rulings during 
                                                
115 E.g., Heartland Plymouth Court MI, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board, 838 F.3d 
16, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Grant Medical Center v. Burwell, Civ. No. 15-480, 2016 WL 
4574648, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2016). 
116 Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-1p.  Cf. Peters v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 302, 305 n.2 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(explaining who is bound by what precedent in immigration adjudication). 
117 ROBERT J. HUME, HOW COURTS IMPACT FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 25 
(2009). 
118 Id. 
119 MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS: THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 139-143 (1990). 
120 Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-1p. 
121 Compare Bird v. Commissioner of Social Security, 669 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2012), 
with Soc. Sec. Ruling 06-3p.  
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the acquiescence policy’s thirty-year history.122  After an initial flurry of 
acquiescence rulings in the 1980s, when the policy began, the SSA’s pace 
has slowed markedly.  Since 1990, the SSA has issued only three 
acquiescence rulings for the Second Circuit, for example,123 and only three 
for the Seventh Circuit – a court that generated at least ten published 
opinions adverse to the agency in 2015 alone.124   
 The tactics agencies can use to limit case law’s significance matter 
less if agencies have no reason to resist regulation by precedent.  But they 
do, for several reasons.  First, agencies may believe that generalist courts 
inexpertly craft doctrine.  Second, circuit-specific precedent can interfere 
with an agency’s effort to administer a single national policy uniformly 
across the country.125  An agency may believe that justice lies in the 
consistent treatment of regulated entities or beneficiaries, regardless of what 
courts say in different parts of the country.126  Also, the administration of a 
policy that splinters into dozens of geographically determined variants, to 
be applied by hundreds of different adjudicators, could prove impossibly 
difficult to administer.  ALJs and IJs have earned harsh criticism for 
decisional inconsistencies.127  While IJ disparities remain stubborn and 
notorious,128 the SSA has undertaken significant efforts to identify reasons 
for ALJ idiosyncrasy and to counteract them.129  If the SSA instructed ALJs 
to abide by circuit and district precedent, the agency would invite ALJs to 
draw their own judgment about governing policy and complicate its efforts 
to get more than 1,000 adjudicators on roughly the same policy compliant 
                                                
122 All acquiescence rulings are available here: www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ar-
toc.html. 
123 See www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ar/02/AR02toc.html. 
124 See www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/rulings/ar/07/AR07toc.html.  Hill v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 862 
(7th Cir. 2015); Alaura v. Colvin, 797 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2015); Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 
711 (7th Cir. 2015); Price v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2015); Varga v. Colvin, 794 
F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2015); Engstrand v. Colvin, 788 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2015); Voight v. 
Colvin, 781 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2015); Adaire v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2015); Hall 
v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015); Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2015). 
125 Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1193, 1206-1208 (1992). 
126 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 74-75. 
127 E.g., GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 84-85 & n.444. 
128 E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, 
ASYLUM: VARIATIONS EXIST IN OUTCOMES OF APPLICATIONS ACROSS IMMIGRATION 
COURTS AND JUDGES 2 (2016); id. at 17. 
129 Gerald K. Ray & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Government Success Story: How Data Analysis 
by the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Push from the Administrative Conference of 
the United States) Is Transforming Social Security Disability Adjudication, 83 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1575, 1606 (2015) 
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page.  For this reason,130 the SSA has instructed ALJs and decision writers 
“not to consider any district court decisions.”131  
If an agency is recalcitrant, Congress can structure judicial review to 
maximize courts’ power to create a precedential effect.  As some have 
proposed for social security disability claims litigation, Congress can 
require that appeals go directly to circuit courts, not district courts, and it 
can steer all appeals to a single circuit.132  Doing so would undermine a key 
argument for nonacquiescence, that different instructions from 
geographically dispersed courts would flummox an agency’s effort to 
administer a single national policy.  But this arrangement would require 
either significantly less litigation, a dramatic change to judicial standards 
for acceptable decision-making, or a huge increase in the size of the 
designated appellate court.  When Congress contemplated legislation to 
send all immigration appeals to the Federal Circuit, its chief judge estimated 
that judicial time for decision-making would plummet to an hour-and-a-half 
per case as a result.133  Were Congress to centralize all of the disability 
appeals currently pending before the regional circuits in the Federal Circuit, 
its caseload would spike by 25%, assuming no changes in claimant 
behavior; if all disability cases pending before the district courts went to the 
Federal Circuit, the latter would have to grow by dozens of judges to keep 
its caseload at manageable levels.134                 
3. Feedback 
 
Whether binding or not, court decisions can serve as a valuable 
source of feedback and thereby discharge a critical function.  An agency can 
always examine its wins and losses in court to look for ways to improve.  
                                                
130 Memorandum to All Administrative Law Judges and All Senior Attorneys from Debra 
Bice, Chief Administrative Law Judge, Jan. 11, 2013, at 2 (on file with authors); see also 
GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 76. 
131 Bice Memorandum, supra note 130 at 2. 
132 E.g., Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for 
Reform, 1990 BYU L. REV. 461, 512. 
133 Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 4 (2006) (Statement of Paul R. Michel, C.J.). 
134 In FY 2014, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims decided about 175 petitions and 
appeals on the merits per “active judge.”  See Annual Report, U.S. Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims, Oct. 1, 2013, to September 30, 2014 (Fiscal Year 2014), at 5, at 
www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2014AnnualReport06MAR15FINAL.pdf.  A court 
of appeals handling all 20,000 social security cases presently filed in the district courts 
would have to have 114 judges dedicated just to this litigation to have an equivalent 
caseload.  The CAVC has attracted criticism for its backlog.  E.g., Jerry Markton, 
Veterans’ Court Faces Backlog that Continues to Grow, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2011.  
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But several institutional contrasts between courts and agencies may reduce 
agency incentives to do so. 
One involves institutional goals.  On a superficial level, agencies 
and courts share the same goal: the accurate and efficient implementation of 
the relevant regulatory regime.  On another, however, these goals diverge.  
Agencies attempt to meet standards for decisional quality, but quantity – 
case completion goals, production quotas, and so forth – matter just as 
much, if not more, in measures of agency performance.135  Quality conflicts 
with quantity, for obvious reasons.136  ALJs surely could generate better 
decisions with half as many claims to adjudicate, but claimants would then 
wait twice as long for a hearing.  The SSA is legitimately concerned with 
the injustice of a claim unreasonably delayed.137  It faces constant and 
enduring scrutiny for its claims backlog,138 as does the EOIR.139  
Agencies have the complex task of successfully managing the 
tradeoff between quantity and quality.  Typically, the federal courts do not 
shoulder the same obligation to generate large numbers of decisions 
quickly. 140   Agencies constantly monitor adjudicator productivity and 
evaluate performance in terms of it.141  The institutional culture of the 
federal judiciary would not permit the same sort of pressure on individual 
judges.142  Moreover, the federal courts do not endure the same legislative 
and public scrutiny for their pace of decision-making that agencies routinely 
                                                
135 See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal With the Dysfunctions of 
Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 1, 12 (2009); STAFF OF THE H. COMM. 
ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, MISPLACED PRIORITIES: HOW THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SACRIFICED QUALITY FOR QUANTITY IN THE DISABILITY 
DETERMINATION PROCESS (2014). 
136 Association of Administrative Law Judges v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 402, 404-05 (7th Cir. 
2015); Stephen W. Gilliland & Ronald S. Landis, Quality and Quantity Goals in a 
Complex Decision Task: Strategies and Outcomes, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 672, 680 (1992).   
137 Cf. Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989). 
138 E.g., David A. Fahrenthold, At Social Security Office With a Million Person Backlog, 
There’s a New Chief, WASH. POST, July 23, 2015. 
139 E.g., Julia Preston, Deluged Immigration Courts, Where Cases Stall for Years, Begin to 
Buckle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2016, at A1. 
140 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 140-141 (2008) (commenting on district 
judges’ sensitivity to delays in deciding motions but noting that there is no sanction for 
delays). But cf. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Striking a Devil’s Bargain: The Federal Courts 
and Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-First Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 473, 
476 (2009) (observing that about one-third of Ninth Circuit cases get decided by a 
“screening panel” of judges that spend four to nine minutes on each after a workup by a 
staff attorney). 
141 E.g., GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 41. 
142 Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency 
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 516-517 
(1990). 
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confront.  Federal judges can therefore render particularized justice tailored 
to the circumstances of an individual case, without significant regard for 
production quotas.  Differences in resources available to decide cases 
exacerbate the significance of these contrasting goals.  An ALJ adjudicating 
40-50 cases per month and a district judge and her clerk “picking apart a 
case for a week” have fundamentally different jobs, as one ALJ aptly put 
it.143   
An agency adjudicator might treat judicial feedback as unhelpful if 
it does not account for her need to produce decisions quickly under severe 
resource constraints.  An example involves the enforcement of subpoenas 
ALJs issue to medical providers for relevant records.144  To some federal 
courts, especially in pro se cases, the mere issuance of a subpoena does not 
discharge the ALJ’s obligation to “develop the record”145 when the person 
or entity being subpoenaed does not respond.146  An ALJ who seeks a 
subpoena’s enforcement, however, must trigger a cumbersome, time-
intensive process.147  The SSA may follow through on a particular court 
remand requiring a subpoena’s enforcement.  But the agency is not likely to 
act on this feedback more generally and institutionalize a subpoena 
enforcement policy, given the demands of its caseload.148  
A second institutional difference might affect the filter through 
which adjudicators view court feedback, countering its potency.  Agency 
adjudicators might feel obliged to honor aggregate level, agency wide 
policy goals that courts do not countenance.149  A need to “protect the 
Fund” and the overall health of the social security program might influence 
                                                
143 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 74. 
144 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, HEARINGS, APPEALS, AND LITIGATION LAW 
MANUAL § I-2-5-78, at www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/hallex/html [hereinafter 
“HALLEX”]; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950(d)(1) and 416.1450(d)(1). 
145 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(d)-(e), 416.912(d)-(e). 
146 E.g., Sanchez v. Barnhart, 329 F. Supp. 2d 445, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Suriel v. Comm’r 
of Social Security, Civ. No. 05-1218, 2006 WL 2516429, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2006); 
Brandow v. Comm’r of Social Security, Civ. No. 05-917, 2009 WL 2971543, at *5 n.6 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009).  But see Serrano v. Barnhart, Civ. No. 02-6372, 2005 WL 
3018256, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2005); Friedman v. Astrue, Civ. No. 07-3651, 2008 
WL 3861211, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2008). 
147 HALLEX, supra note 144 § I-2-5-82; 42 U.S.C. § 405(e).  Cf. Yancey v. Apfel, 145 F.3d 
106, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (expressing concerns over “the financial and administrative 
burdens of processing disability claims” that a rule requiring the SSA to subpoena treating 
physicians at the claimant’s behest would entail).   
148 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 19-20. 
149 Jerry L. Mashaw, Organizing Adjudication: Reflections on the Prospect for Artisans in 
the Age of Robots, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1992). 
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ALJ decision-making in individual cases. 150   Observers have long 
commented on the uncomfortable placement of IJs within the DOJ, 
suggesting that this institutional arrangement may skew decision-making in 
favor of strict enforcement.151  Federal judges face no such aggregate-level 
pressure for the successful administration of a complex regulatory regime. 
Two other institutional differences can also undermine guidance  
derived from judicial opinions.  The first is the baseline problem described 
above.  A nitpicky remand of a clearly meritless claim might lead the ALJ 
to discount the district court’s order, and perhaps future ones, as 
uninformed.  Second, the agency might explicitly discourage its 
adjudicators from considering court remands as a source of feedback, 
concerned that doing so might create discrepancies in adjudicators’ 
understandings of policy compliant decision-making. 
 Whatever the reason, the SSA presently does little as an agency152 to 
mine district court remand decisions for instruction.  An ALJ who gets 
remanded will see the decision, but the decision writer who drafted it will 
not. 153   Neither does the Appeals Council analyst nor the appellate 
adjudicator.  The EOIR has no mechanism in place to ensure that staff 
attorneys involved in a decision that gets remanded see the court opinion 
and learn from it.154 
 
* * * 
 
 The foregoing dwells on the many institutional impediments that 
interfere with judicial review’s corrective, regulative, and critical functions.  
The story may not be quite so bleak.  In particular instances courts may 
discharge one or more of the functions more successfully.  The body of 
immigration law that IJs administer, for instance, owes a good deal to 
federal circuit precedent.  Also, the case for judicial review should not 
depend upon the justificatory force of any single function in isolation but 
rather the cumulative contributions that courts can make.  Courts may not 
correct errors more efficiently than adjudicators can avoid them, but if they 
                                                
150 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 79; Statement of the Association of 
Administrative Law Judges, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social 
Security, June 27, 2012, at 4-5. 
151 E.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: 
IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 178 (1997); A.B.A. House of Delegates Resolution 
114F, Feb. 8-9, 2010, at 4-5. 
152 ALJs on their own in some instances have created organized methods of deriving 
feedback from district court decisions.  GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 119-120. 
153 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 174-175. 
154 Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get There From Here: Managing Judicial Review of 
Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 427 (2007). 
Rethinking Judicial Review (Texas Law Review, forthcoming 2018) 
 33 
can rectify some mistakes and exert some regulative influence, however 
limited, then perhaps the case for judicial review of high volume agency 
adjudication strengthens. 
 Those who have studied high volume agency adjudication most 
closely remain unconvinced. The Mashaw group favored the replacement of 
Article III review of ALJ decision-making with a specialized social security 
court,155 a recommendation seconded by distinguished commentators.156  
When Congress caved to judicial pressure and created judicial review for 
veterans benefits adjudication in 1988, it opted for a specialized Article I 
court.157  A proposal to jettison review of IJ decisions by the regional courts 
of appeals gained traction in Congress in the mid-2000s.158  Many clearly 
continue to believe that whatever benefits Article III review brings to high 
volume agency adjudication, they fall short of justifying it. 
III. PROBLEM-ORIENTED OVERSIGHT 
 Judgments about judicial review’s wisdom are incomplete, because 
existing accounts of its role supervising high volume agency adjudication 
have overlooked a key function courts can perform.  This function has 
something important to do with an interesting dynamic apparent in the case 
law this litigation generates.  Often boring and repetitive, appeals typically 
yield cookie cutter opinions of little significance.159  Not infrequently, 
however, judges break this tedium with extraordinary commentary on 
patterns or trends they have observed.  Identifying a set of ALJ decisions he 
found troubling, for example, a magistrate judge recently described some 
social security proceedings as “border[ing] on madness.160  In a separate 
opinion released the same day, he denounced ALJ decisions as “littered 
with recurring issues” and lampooned social security appeals as 
“Groundhog Day.” 161   Perhaps such statements, which are legion in 
immigration opinions162 and not uncommon in social security cases,163 are 
                                                
155 MASHAW ET AL., supra note 38 at 146-150. 
156 Verkuil & Lubbers, supra note 15 at 776; id. at 781-782. 
157 Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process, 90 NEB. L. 
REV. 388, 396 (2011). 
158 E.g., Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 2 (2006) (Statement of Sen. Specter). 
159 E.g., MASHAW ET AL., supra note 38 at 140. 
160 Wallace v. Colvin, 193 F. Supp. 3d 939, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
161 Booth v. Colvin, Civ. No. 14-50347, 2016 WL 3476700, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2016). 
162 E.g., Legomsky, supra note 45 at 1645 (referring to “the unprecedented scathing 
criticisms that so many U.S. courts of appeals have leveled at EOIR”). 
163 E.g., Hughes v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 2013); Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 
F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 2004); Freismuth v. Astrue, 920 F. Supp. 2d 943, 954 (E.D. Wis. 
2013); Batista v. Colvin, Civ. No. 13-4185, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80576, at *6. 
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little more than outbursts of judicial frustration.  But Article III judges tend 
to keep their powder pretty dry, so we interpret this sort of commentary as 
purposeful.   
From time to time, judges try to influence agency decision-making 
through means beyond the correction of discrete errors in individual cases 
or the issuance of binding precedent.  A comparison provides some insight 
into what courts might be up to.  Congress has a lot of tools at its disposal to 
influence agency behavior.164  One important one is a form of oversight, by 
which legislators assemble information on an agency, then comment 
publicly and critically on its performance.165  Although in theory backed by 
the threat of a budget cut or some other legislative sanction, these 
congressional interventions can derive force simply from the informal 
pressure they generate.166  We argue that courts attempt something similar, 
what we call “problem-oriented oversight,” when they decide certain 
appeals.   
Courts engage in problem-oriented oversight when they identify and 
respond to “problems,” defined either as flawed administrations of policy 
by the agency, or as the agency’s nonresponse to an entrenched decision-
making pathology.  This Part distinguishes problem-oriented oversight from 
existing models of agency oversight and explains how courts engage in the 
task.  Part IV examines the institutional factors that determine whether this 
function can succeed. 
A. Models of Agency Oversight 
 
The notion that judicial review functions as a type of agency  
oversight is hardly novel.167  What exactly this oversight is and how courts 
conduct it in the context of high volume agency adjudication, however, 
have attracted little examination.  
We begin with what Mariano-Florentino Cuellar aptly calls an 
“incredibly durable framework for thinking about legislative oversight of 
the bureaucracy,”168 a subject that has garnered more study than court-based 
oversight.  This canonical framework describes oversight in terms of two 
                                                
164 See generally Jack M. Beerman, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
61 (2006). 
165 Id. at 122-127. 
166 Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair “the Broken Branch”?, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 765, 784-785 (2009) 
167 See generally David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. 
L.J. 723 (2009).  
168 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
227, 297 (2006). 
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models.169  When Congress engages in “police patrol oversight,” it surveys 
a large number of agency decisions or actions, selected at random, to 
determine if the agency is functioning properly.  Like a police officer 
cruising a neighborhood, this oversight happens when, “at its own initiative, 
Congress examines a sample of executive-agency actions, with the aim of 
detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by its 
surveillance, discouraging such violations.”170  Police patrol oversight is 
proactive and often regular and ongoing.171  Examples include making an 
agency submit annual reports to Congress, obliging agency officials to 
appear at committee hearings in connection with an annual budget 
request,172 and submitting an agency to examination by the Government 
Accountability Office.173   
“Fire alarm oversight,” the second model, responds to institutional 
constraints, including high costs and inconstant legislator attention, that in 
theory limit the efficacy of police patrols.174  Rather than itself gather and 
sift through large amounts of information about agency performance to find 
possible problems, “Congress establishes a system of rules, procedures, and 
informal practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest 
groups to examine administrative decisions . . . , to charge executive 
agencies with violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from 
agencies, courts, and Congress itself . . . .175  Such mechanisms are “fire 
alarms” that third parties can ring and thereby direct oversight attention to 
agency misconduct.  Thus, this oversight is episodic and reactive.   
 A recent disability benefits scandal nicely illustrates fire alarm 
oversight.  David Daugherty, an ALJ in Huntington, West Virginia, granted 
benefits in 1,280 of the 1,284 cases he decided in FY 2010.176  This was the 
sixth year in a row in which Daugherty had decided more than 1,000 
cases;177 it came amidst a stunning growth in the nation’s disability rolls, 
and in a year when ALJs granted benefits in more than 70% of cases they 
                                                
169 Matthew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
170 Id. 
171 LINDA L. FOWLER, WATCHDOGS ON THE HILL: THE DECLINE OF CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS 135 (2015).  
172 Beerman, supra note 164 at 66-67. 
173 Id. 
174 McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 169 at 168. 
175 Id. at 166. 
176 Damien Paletta, Judge Can Rarely Rule ‘No’, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2011, at A1. 
177 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, HOW SOME 
LEGAL, MEDICAL, AND JUDICIAL PROFESSIONALS ABUSED SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
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decided on the merits. 178   Protected by a statutory safe harbor, 179  a 
prototypical fire alarm,180 a whistleblower contacted the Wall Street Journal 
to bring Daugherty’s practice of rubber-stamping disability benefits claims 
to light.181  The article prompted several congressional hearings182 and at 
least two committee reports.183  What emerged was criticism that the SSA, 
focused on case completion goals above all else, turned a blind eye as ALJs 
“paid down” a huge backlog of claims.184  Daugherty eventually pleaded 
guilty to felony charges, admitting that he took kickbacks from a local 
social security lawyer who received fees when Daugherty granted his 
clients’ claims.185  Although the SSA denied the blind eye charge, it made 
significant changes, at least partially in response to congressional 
scrutiny.186  The ALJ claim allowance rate declined sharply, to 48% by 
2013.187 
 Although developed to describe versions of Congressional 
oversight, the police patrol and fire alarm models have come to serve as 
descriptions of how a range of overseers, including courts, can supervise 
agencies.188  Judicial review has traditionally been treated as a component 
in a fire alarm system, with courts either as the oversight institution itself, or 
with courts serving as a forum where aggrieved third parties can ring a fire 
alarm and thereby trigger oversight.189  
                                                
178 SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, ASPECTS OF DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: 
DATA AND MATERIALS 12 (2012); Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Chart Book: 
Social Security Disability Insurance, Aug. 23, 2016, at www.cbpp.org/research/social-
security/chart-book-social-security-disability-insurance. 
179 5 U.S.C. § 2302. 
180 E.g., David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1143 (2017). 
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June 27, 2013. 
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186 Statement of Debra Rice, Chief Administrative Law Judge, SSA, before the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Oct. 13, 2013. 
187 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, JUSTIFICATIONS OF ESTIMATES FOR 
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES FISCAL YEAR 2015 144 (2014). 
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B. The Limits of the Fire Alarm Model 
 
 When Richard Posner castigated the “Immigration Court” as “the 
least competent federal agency” in a 2016 opinion,190 perhaps he meant his 
harsh words as an attempt at fire alarm oversight.  A third party, the 
immigrant facing removal, brought an alleged agency problem to a court 
and got Judge Posner to respond vociferously.  But for several reasons the 
fire alarm model imperfectly describes what courts do.  First, courts review 
large numbers of cases, most of which either acceptably decided or at worst 
marred by random error.  Fire alarm oversight is premised on the notion that 
third parties screen agency decisions for the overseer, finding agency flaws 
for a court or a legislature motivated by a court to fix.  If this is so, the 
mechanism would seem to fit high volume agency adjudication poorly.  
Indeed, judicial oversight has some of the markings of a police patrol.  It is 
regular and ongoing, and it involves large numbers of unremarkable agency 
decisions. 
 The ordinariness of judicial review relates to a second reason why it 
does not really serve as a form of fire alarm oversight in the context of high 
volume agency adjudication.  To the extent that fire alarm oversight 
depends upon attracting the attention of Congress or the public at large, the 
regularity of court involvement interferes with the objective.  Not once over 
the past decade has Congress held hearings in response to court decisions in 
social security cases, even as federal judges have fulminated about poor 
quality SSA decision-making.191  If fire alarms ring all the time, then they 
seem less like alarms and more like background noise. 
 Finally, especially for the sorts of problems that courts are uniquely 
well positioned to identify and to try to correct, effective judicial oversight 
of high volume agency adjudication is often not reactive and incident-
driven, but requires judicial proactivity and extended engagement over time.  
Sometimes an appeal from a random ALJ or IJ order sounds the alarm over 
a large-scale matter whose significance a court immediately appreciates.  
When the BIA determined that someone seeking asylum based on her 
experience with female genital mutilation did not establish a risk of future 
persecution because the mutilation happened in the past,192 the Second 
Circuit swiftly rebuked the agency for a “significant error[] in the 
application of its own regulatory framework.”193  But an array of smaller 
                                                
190 Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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bore but nonetheless important pathologies, such as problematic behavior 
by a single adjudicator or flaws in an agency’s internal manual, can plague 
agency decision-making.  Judicial awareness of these problems might 
sharpen only over time, and only as courts engage repeatedly with them. 
C. Problem-Oriented Oversight Through Judicial Review 
 
Judicial review of high volume agency adjudication does not fit the 
police patrol model either.  The process relies upon third parties to identify 
and complain about flawed agency decision-making, which is a defining 
feature of fire alarm oversight.  Courts do not proactively seek out 
adjudicator orders to review, as an auditor randomly sampling decisions to 
get an overall sense of the agency’s performance might.194  But an adjusted 
version of the police patrol metaphor works pretty well to describe the 
oversight role that courts can assume.  “Problem-oriented policing”  
 
posits that police should focus more attention on problems, 
as opposed to incidents . . . . Problems are defined either as 
collections of incidents related in some way (if they occur at 
the same location, for example) or as underlying conditions 
that give rise to incidents, crimes, disorders, and other 
substantive community issues . . . .195 
 
Whereas “incident-driven,” reactive policing focuses on the resolution of 
discrete incidents,196 problem-oriented policing treats each incident as a 
datum, for the identification of underlying factors that create crime and for 
the best possible responses.197  Identifying underlying causes, not clearing 
arrests, is the goal.198 
 Table 2 describes definitional characteristics of fire alarm, police 
patrol, and problem-oriented oversight. 
 
Table 2.  Models of Oversight Compared  
 
Definitional 
Characteristic 
Fire Alarm 
Oversight 
Police Patrol 
Oversight 
Problem-Oriented 
Oversight 
Initiator Third Party Oversight Institution Third Party 
                                                
194 E.g., Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 2011). 
195 Gary Cordner & Elizabeth Perkins Biebel, Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice, 4 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (2005). 
196 ANTHONY A. BRAGA, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING AND CRIME PREVENTION 9 (2d ed. 
2008). 
197 Id. at 10; id. at 15. 
198 Cordner & Biebel, supra note 195 at 156; id. at 158. 
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Regularity of 
Oversight 
Episodic Regular/Ongoing Regular/Ongoing 
Goal of Oversight Problem 
Identification and 
Response 
Overall Assessment 
of Performance 
Problem 
Identification and 
Response 
Mode of Oversight Discrete Response 
to Incident 
Audit of Numerous 
Agency Decisions 
Discrete Response to 
Incident or to Pattern 
Gleaned from 
Review of Numerous 
Agency Decisions 
 
 
When courts engage in problem-oriented oversight, they treat 
appeals as indicators of potential problems.  Of course, many appeals 
simply result from adjudicator “error,” a word we use as a term of art.  But 
“problems,” defined as systematic underlying pathologies in internal agency 
administration that afflict adjudication, can lurk among these flaws.  The 
claimant or immigrant bringing the problem to a court’s attention may not 
know whether his case presents an error or a problem.  Precisely the 
ordinariness of judicial review, or the continuing, routine engagement of 
courts with the agency’s decision-making, enables courts to distinguish 
problems from errors and respond appropriately. 
1. Errors  
 
Agency adjudicators can produce flawed decisions for several 
reasons.  Sometimes they simply err.  The agency has adopted an acceptable 
interpretation of governing law.  An acceptably competent adjudicator 
understands and applies this interpretation.  But in the odd case the 
adjudicator, as a mere mortal, happens to make an error.  Perhaps amidst the 
six hundred pages of medical records in the claimant’s file, an ALJ 
overlooks the physician’s note that confirms a claimant’s alleged 
symptoms. 199   Perhaps the IJ wrongly but not unreasonably treats a 
particular conviction as a “crime involving moral turpitude,” which requires 
the immigrant’s deportation.200   
 When an agency adjudicator errs, a reviewing court can correct the 
error but accomplish little more.  By our definition of error, no underlying 
problem exists to address.  Presumably, the ALJ would have decided the 
case better had she caught the physician’s note, and the case proceeded to 
                                                
199 Cf. Oversight of Rising Social Security Disability Claims and the Role of Administrative 
Law Judges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Health Care and 
Entitlements of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) 
(Statement of Sen. Tom Coburn). 
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federal court only because her mistake slipped past personnel at the Appeals 
Council.  As we have already argued, this error correction offers a marginal 
justification for judicial review of high volume agency adjudication. To 
return to the metaphor, the error correction function is like arresting a 
random lawbreaker, not ferreting out what underlying factors foster 
criminal activity. 
2. Problems 
 
Flawed decisions result from problems, not mere error, in one of two 
situations.  First, the agency may have adopted a bad policy.  Second, the 
agency cannot or will not fix an entrenched decision-making pathology. 
Bad Policy.  Agencies can adopt bad policies.  The BIA’s erstwhile 
stance on female genital mutilation is an example.  An instruction in a 
guidance document or manual that conflicts with governing precedent is 
another, albeit one more likely to fly under the radar and less likely to 
trigger a loud fire alarm.201  However fine the mesh in its net, an internal 
appeals tribunal would never catch flawed adjudicator decisions when the 
shortcomings result from a bad policy, because the tribunal has to abide by 
the policy as well.  Thus it would uphold an adjudicator’s decision 
following the policy as correct.   
Entrenched Pathology.  A second type of problem results when the 
agency is unwilling or unable to correct an entrenched pathology that 
afflicts adjudicator decision-making.  The threat of deliberate indifference 
to certain strains of adjudicator dysfunction lurks in the institutional DNA 
of agencies tasked with large numbers of claims or decisions to make.  The 
number of cases decided is an easily administrable performance metric, but 
one that can reward decision-making that fares poorly by the harder-to-use 
measure of decisional quality.202  If an agency sets production targets or 
quotas, as the EOIR and SSA do, it may find the temptation to ignore 
warning signs of serious adjudicator dysfunction overwhelming.203  Judge 
Daugherty, the Huntington ALJ, had a shockingly high allowance rate and 
decided astonishing numbers of cases.  Together with the $600 million in 
lifetime benefits he awarded,204 these dubious achievements should have 
                                                
201 For examples of flawed guidance documents, see, e.g., Harris v. Astrue, Civ. No. 09-
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raised red flags in SSA headquarters.205  Instead, notwithstanding a well-
documented morale and management problem in the Huntington hearing 
office, the SSA, under pressure to keep a growing backlog at bay,206 
transferred 1,186 aged cases there between 2006 and 2011.207  During this 
time, the SSA based its evaluations of ALJ performance solely on number 
of cases decided, with no adjustment for decisional quality.208  
The Huntington episode did not trigger judicial review because the 
SSA generally cannot appeal when an ALJ grants benefits.  But an agency 
focused on numbers might just as well turn a blind eye to poor-quality 
decision-making that harms claimants or immigrants if the adjudicator 
decides a lot of cases.209  The Atlanta immigration court decides cases in 
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immigrants’ favor at astonishingly low rates.210  Persistent criticism for 
perceived bias against immigrants hounds Atlanta IJs,211 and at least one 
Atlanta IJ has attracted a disproportionate number of formal complaints.212  
But, as an observer speculates, the EOIR has not taken significant steps at 
reform, perhaps because the Atlanta immigration court decides large 
numbers of cases.213  
 Entrenched pathologies might persist for reasons other than 
deliberate indifference, but ones equally baked into the institutional 
structure of agency adjudication.  Agency adjudicators often enjoy 
employment protections that amount to a minor league version of life 
tenure.214  The SSA cannot take disciplinary action against an ALJ based 
solely on how the ALJ decides cases,215 and its power to force ALJs to 
manage their cases in particular ways is tightly constrained.216  An ALJ 
bears almost no risk of termination.217  Indeed, the SSA believes that it 
cannot suspend an ALJ without pay, much less terminate him, until that 
ALJ has exhausted his appeals before the Merit Systems Protection Board.  
                                                
210 E.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 331 (2007). 
211 E.g., Letter to Juan P. Osuna, Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review, from 
Hallie Ludsin, Emory Law School, et al., Mar. 2, 2017, at 5-6. 
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FY 2009.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Exec. Office for Immig. Rev., Fact Sheet, Executive Office 
for Immigration Review Immigration Judge Hiring Initiative, Mar. 11, 2010, at 3.  The 
average IJ, in other words, received .38 complaints during the time period IJ Pelletier 
received 5. 
213 Jacqueline Stevens, Lawless Courts, THE NATION, Nov. 8, 2010.  
214 Glenn Sklar Testimony, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, June 27, 
2013. 
215 Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1989). 
216 Initial Decision and Order, Social Security Administration v. Butler, Merit Systems 
Protection Board, Case No. CB-7251-14-0014-T-1, Sept. 16, 2015, at 18-31; Emilia Scilia, 
Combating Biased Adjudication in Claims for Social Security Disability Benefits, 
CLEARINGHOUSE COMMUNITY, May 2014, at 
http://povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/stories/sicilia. 
217 Statement of Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Before 
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm. on Social Security, and the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law, July 11, 
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This extended process can create considerable delay.218  After pleading 
guilty to a felony charge, for example, an ALJ who had sexually assaulted 
an employee in a hearing room during work hours while intoxicated 
received his salary for three more years until the MSPB had finally finished 
its review.219  
Such protections, a (lesser) version of which IJs also enjoy,220 give 
agency adjudicators a plausible claim to independence.221  But they can lead 
to inertia or conflict avoidance within the agency and slow down or arrest 
efforts to respond to decision-making pathologies.  Notwithstanding 
repeated federal judicial criticism of his performance,222 for instance, one 
ALJ remained a hearing office chief administrative law judge until a class 
of 4,000 denied claimants filed a lawsuit against the SSA, alleging that due 
process violations systemically plagued his and several colleagues’ case 
management.223  Only upon the lawsuit’s filing did the SSA relieve the ALJ 
of his management role.224    
3. Distinguishing Errors from Problems 
 
To succeed as overseers, courts have to be able to distinguish  
problems from errors.  Sometimes the former are obvious.  A sharp uptick 
in court remands suggests something more systematic afoot than 
idiosyncratic adjudicator error.  When the SSA terminated disability 
benefits for hundreds of thousands of claimants in the early 1980s,225 
appeals flooded the courts, and the court remand rate jumped from 19% in 
1980 to 60.5% in 1984.226  The SSA’s problematic policies with regard to 
                                                
218 SOC. SEC. ADMIN, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT REPORT, 
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369, 373-374 (2006). 
221 E.g., Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1647 
(2016).  
222 Lazo-Espinoza v. Astrue, Civ. No. 10-2089, 2012 WL 1031417, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 
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301945, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010); Legare v. Comm’r, Civ. No. 08-2180, 2010 WL 
5390958, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010); Ginsberg v. Astrue, Civ. No. 05-3696, 2008 WL 
3876067, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2008). 
223 Amended Complaint, Padro v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11-1788, E.D.N.Y., May 4, 2011, at 
https://mhp.urbanjustice.org/sites/default/files/2011-05-04_Amended_Complaint.pdf. 
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11, 2013. 
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mental impairments and continuing disability review quickly became 
obvious.227  Likewise, if sufficiently awry, even a single flawed decision 
can suggest an entrenched pathology.  The Ninth Circuit described an IJ’s 
decision denying asylum in a 2005 case as “a literally incomprehensible 
opinion,” “indecipherable,” and “extreme in its lack of a coherent 
explanation,”228 flaws that loudly signaled a troubled adjudicator.229   
In many instances, however, problems manifest themselves less 
clearly.  These are ones where the bad policy or the entrenched pathology is 
subtler, and thus demonstrates its faults only over time.  The SSA provides 
ALJs with a digital template that generates boilerplate for decisions.  Before 
2012, this text included a poorly written paragraph that presented an ALJ’s 
findings in a manner that suggested that the ALJ had improperly assessed 
the claimant’s credibility.230  This flawed boilerplate is an example of a bad 
policy.  But it is one whose demerits as such – that is, as a policy and not a 
random error – would likely become evident only as courts saw the same 
boilerplate over and over again.   
Courts catch problems of this scale by reviewing large numbers of 
cases, identifying patterns of flaws, and determining that something more 
than random error creates them.  What follows is a highly stylized 
description of this process, one that no court of which we are aware actually 
uses.  It owes a debt to a method the SSA has pioneered, using Appeals 
Council data to find problems in ALJ decision-making.231  We believe it 
illuminates the mental steps courts proceed through as they identify 
problems.  We present the method here, to argue how courts should oversee 
high volume agency adjudication, then defend their capacity to use it in Part 
IV.   
The first step involves devising the proper classifications of 
potential problems.  As with problem-oriented policing, broad 
classifications are “too heterogeneous” to yield much information about 
                                                
227 Levy, supra note 132 at 487. 
228 De Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1193-1194 (9th Cir. 2005).   
229 When interviewed about the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the IJ insisted that “the 
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230 Bjornsen v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2012); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 
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agency adjudication,232 a claim we elaborate upon at length in our report.233  
Problem-oriented policing uses “highly nuanced and precise problem 
definitions.”234  To understand what factors generate burglaries in Tucson, 
Arizona, for example, the police should not keep just track of “burglaries.”  
Instead they should also gather data on “burglaries in college dormitories,” 
“burglaries in neighborhoods with alleyways,” and so forth.   
Problem-oriented oversight through judicial review should do the 
same.  In the social security context, for example, courts should identify 
potential problems not as “remands,” or even “remands to the Brooklyn 
Hearing Office.”  Rather, courts should develop categories that can identify 
flawed policies at the level of detail at which the agency crafts it, and they 
should use categories that can identify entrenched pathologies at the level at 
which they fester.  The problems might be “treating source – opinion 
rejected without adequate articulation,” or “inadequate rationale for 
credibility finding.”235  The entrenched pathology category might track 
decisions at the individual ALJ level, and certainly at the hearing office 
level. 
 To identify patterns and thus potential problems, courts could then 
use problem definitions to map data gathered from decisions.  For any 
particular judicial review context the map would differ and depend on 
courts’ sense of where problems likely will come from and how they might 
materialize.  Table 3 tracks reasons for remands from judges in the 
hypothetical District of East Dakota a three-year period.  It offers a simple 
illustration of how a federal district might organize data capturing 
arguments made and reasons given in social security cases. 
 
Table 3.  D.E.D. Remands as a Percentage of Appeals, by Reason Given, 
FY2014-2016 
 
		 		
Treating	
Source	 --	
Inadequate	
Articulation	
Inadequate	
Rationale	 for	
Credibility	
Finding	
Inadequate	 Rationale	 given	 for	
Weight	 Given	 Consultative	
Examiner's	Opinion	
Mental	 Disorder	
Not	 Adequately	
Considered	
Hearing	
Office	
No.	1	 ALJ	1	 0.33		 0.4	 0.22	 0.29	
		 ALJ	2	 0.25		 0.25	 0.4	 0.33	
		 ALJ	3	 0.6	 0.62	 0.65	 0.74	
                                                
232 Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-Oriented Policing, 39 CRIME AND JUSTICE 
1, 7 (2010). 
233 GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 52-56. 
234 Reisig, supra note 232 at 7. 
235 Top 10 Remand Reasons Cited by the Court on Remands to SSA (FY 2010-FY 2016), 
at https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC08_Top_10_CR.html#fy2015. 
Rethinking Judicial Review 
 46 
Hearing	
Office	
No.	2	 ALJ	4	 0.3	 0.33	 0.22	 0.4	
		 ALJ	5	 0.58	 0.64	 0.56	 0.72	
		 ALJ	6	 0.37	 0.19	 0.29	 0.42	
 
Table 3 breaks down reasons for remands into more precise categories that 
may correspond to detailed policy decisions the agency might make.  The 
SSA, for instance, might urge its ALJs to assess credibility in a particular 
manner, or to use a particular approach to considering mental impairments.  
These policy determinations should show up in arguments claimants make 
for remands and reasons courts give for ruling in their favor.  Table 3 also 
recognizes the possibility that a particular ALJ might be deciding cases in a 
pathological way, or that a particular hearing office suffers from 
pathological management.   
 The district would then organize data on its judges’ decisions, to see 
if they suggest any particular problems.  The numbers in each of Table 3’s 
cells is a fraction, indicating how often a court concludes that a particular 
ALJ’s decisions contain particular flaws.  The numerator represents the 
number of cases in which the court agrees that the ALJ’s decision contains 
the flaw, and the denominator is the number of cases in which the claimant 
argues that the ALJ’s decision contains the flaw.  Organized thusly, the data 
yield a heat map that highlights potential problems.  Table 3, for instance, 
indicates that ALJs 3 and 5 produce unusually high numbers of remands, 
regardless of the alleged flaw, and have done so consistently.  Their 
decisions’ high rate of failure across the board may suggest adjudicator 
dysfunction, and its persistence over multiple years may indicate an 
entrenched pathology that the agency cannot or will not correct.   
Table 4 gives an example of a heat map that indicates an entrenched 
pathology at the hearing office level. 
 
Table 4.  Hearing Office Pathology 
 
		 		
Treating	
Source	 --	
Inadequate	
Articlulation	
Inadequate	
Rationale	 for	
Credibility	
Finding	
Inadequate	 Rationale	 given	 for	
Weight	 Given	 Consultative	
Examiner's	Opinion	
Mental	 Disorder	
Not	 Adequately	
Considered	
Hearing	
Office	
No.	1	
ALJ	
1	 0.6	 0.6	 0.4	 0.6	
		
ALJ	
2	 0.52	 0.63	 0.55	 0.33	
		
ALJ	
3	 0.58	 0.4	 0.48	 0.59	
Hearing	
Office	
No.	2	
ALJ	
4	 0.3	 0.33	 0.22	 0.33	
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ALJ	
5	 0.4	 0.27	 0.38	 0.4	
		
ALJ	
6	 0.37	 0.19	 0.29	 0.42	
 
The consistency with which the District of East Dakota finds fault with ALJ 
decisions from Hearing Office 1 suggests that the problem lies not with a 
single idiosyncratic ALJ, but with some office-wide phenomenon.  But the 
office-wide phenomenon is likely office-specific, because the ALJs from 
Hearing Office 2 enjoy markedly better success across the board.  A bad 
policy should produce a heat map along the lines of what Table 5 illustrates. 
 
Table 5.  Bad Policy 
 
		 		
Treating	
Source	 --	
Inadequate	
Articlulation	
Inadequate	
Rationale	 for	
Credibility	
Finding	
Inadequate	 Rationale	 given	 for	
Weight	 Given	 Consultative	
Examiner's	Opinion	
Mental	 Disorder	
Not	 Adequately	
Considered	
Hearing	
Office	
No.	1	
ALJ	
1	 0.33	 0.25	 0.28	 0.65	
		
ALJ	
2	 0.25	 0.33	 0.34	 0.66	
		
ALJ	
3	 0.4	 0.44	 0.32	 0.59	
Hearing	
Office	
No.	2	
ALJ	
4	 0.36	 0.37	 0.22	 0.64	
		
ALJ	
5	 0.18	 0.19	 0.25	 0.7	
		
ALJ	
6	 0.41	 0.3	 0.11	 0.62	
    
Again, as far as we know, no court actually uses this method or 
something like it to identify problems with agency adjudication.  But some 
courts have engaged in an impressionistic version of the method for social 
security and immigration cases.  In a 2005 opinion, for example, the Third 
Circuit marshaled a number of examples from cases to document “a 
disturbing pattern of IJ misconduct” involving “intemperate or humiliating 
remarks” directed at immigrants.236  The Second Circuit listed six previous 
instances when it had commented on a particular IJ’s inappropriate behavior 
in an opinion reversing the IJ for another episode of similar misconduct.237  
The Tenth Circuit identified repeated instances when it faulted the SSA for 
ALJ decisions that rely exclusively on boilerplate language for credibility 
                                                
236 Wang v. Attorney General, 423 F.3d 260, 267-268 (3d Cir. 2005). 
237 Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Huang v. Gonzales, 453 
F.3d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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discussions.238  A district judge in Wisconsin came closer to what we 
recommend here when he buttressed a scathing critique of “a wholly 
dysfunctional administrative process within the Social Security 
Administration” with pages of statistics demonstrating the agency’s poor 
record before his court.239 
 
4. Responding to Problems 
 
Problem-oriented policing counsels for a variety of responses  
beyond the mere arrest of perpetrators to address patterns of criminal 
activity.  A police department, for example, might deploy social workers 
alongside police officers when criminal activity involves mentally ill 
people.  Hospitalization and treatment might be the interventions instead of 
arrest.240  Congress as an oversight institution likewise can choose from an 
extensive menu of tools when it addresses problems within an agency.241  
The federal courts in contrast appear to lack remedial options beyond 
issuing remands.  They seem confined to error correction, a form of 
reactive, incident-driven policing. 
 But courts in fact have several oversight tools at their disposal.  
First, they can criticize agency adjudicators in terms calculated to cause 
consternation or shame.  In a 2005 opinion, for instance, the Third Circuit 
denounced “[t]he tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the 
IJ” as “more appropriate to a court television show than a federal court 
proceeding.”242  A district judge singled out an ALJ and insisted that his 
decision “shows a blatant disregard, not only of the legal standards, but of 
his obligations as a judicial officer and the basic rights and humanity of a 
vulnerable segment of our society, the disabled.”243  Naming an IJ, the 
Second Circuit included an extended and detailed summary of the many 
errors he committed, including extensive quotations from the hearing he 
conducted, in a 2006 opinion. 244   The Ninth Circuit reproduced an 
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“incoherent” order by an IJ in full as an appendix to a scathing opinion, 
letting the IJ’s incompetence speak for itself.245 
 Courts can also exploit bureaucratic fault lines to force an agency to 
respond.  Agencies that lack independent litigating authority, such as the 
SSA and the EOIR, control neither when they appeal to the federal circuits 
nor their advocacy before the federal circuits.246  The DOJ takes a very 
conservative approach to what matters it wants to appear before the courts 
of appeals, wary of administrative law precedent that might affect the 
federal government’s litigating position trans-substantively.247  Rather than 
risk an adverse appellate decision, the DOJ might pressure the EOIR or 
SSA to correct a problem instead.  Another fault line involves the personnel 
who defend ALJ and IJ decisions in federal court.  They are not the same as 
those who supervise agency adjudicators.248  A DOJ lawyer may tire of 
defending questionable decisions that prompt hostile court reactions and 
request that the EOIR take some corrective action.249  A court might 
threaten the agency’s lawyer with sanctions if the agency continues to insist 
on defending flawed decisions, or if the agency does not take steps to 
correct the problem.250 
 Courts can also adopt doctrines that raise the costs for agencies if 
they do not correct a problem.  The Ninth Circuit applies something called 
the “credit-as-true” rule in social security cases.  Until recently,251 the most 
commonly identified flaw with ALJ decisions involved their failure 
adequately to explain why the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician 
did not establish the claimant’s disability.252  In most circuits, courts will 
remand cases with such treating physician flaws.  The ALJ gets another 
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248 The DOJ’s Office of Immigration Litigation handles immigration appeals, and the 
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251 The SSA replaced the treating physician rule by regulation in January 2017.  Revisions 
to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). 
252 E.g., SSA website; Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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chance to explain why the treating physician’s opinion does not merit 
deference.253  In the Ninth Circuit, however, courts must “credit-as-true” 
treating physician evidence that the ALJ does not adequately discount.  If 
that evidence, taken as true, establishes the claimant’s disability, the court 
will remand for the payment of benefits only and refuse to give the ALJ 
another crack at the case.254  Particularly irritating to the SSA,255 the credit-
as-true rule raises the cost of ALJs’ failure to grapple adequately with 
treating physician evidence.  
 An additional tool dovetails with fire alarm oversight.  Courts can 
draw media attention to what are otherwise obscure and ignored parts of the 
federal courts’ docket with scathing commentary, or by otherwise 
publicizing what can easily pass under the media’s radar.  Judicial 
commentary on adjudicator performance can buttress other advocates’ calls 
or efforts for reform.256  The complaint in Padro v. Colvin, a class action 
filed in New York against the SSA, quoted from dozens of judicial opinions 
remanding claims to support allegations that some Queens Hearing Office 
ALJs systemically deprived claimants of due process.257     
 Finally, Article III judges can use their considerable prestige to 
pursue reform while off the bench.  Disheartened by the problems that have 
plagued immigration adjudication, 258  Robert Katzmann of the Second 
Circuit first spearheaded a prominent study of immigrants’ access to 
counsel,259 then created a public interest law organization that represents 
thousands of immigrants in cases before IJs.260  Margaret McKeown of the 
Ninth Circuit helped kickstart a similar effort in San Diego,261 as has 
Michael Chagares of the Third Circuit in New Jersey.262 
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IV. EVALUATING PROBLEM-ORIENTED OVERSIGHT 
Problem-oriented oversight adds to the list of functions judicial  
review can play in the context of high volume agency adjudication.  In Part 
II, we described institutional determinants that limited the contribution that 
any of the other functions, on its own, could make to the case for judicial 
review of high volume agency adjudication.  Problem-oriented oversight 
strengthens judicial review’s normative foundation only if it fares better by 
an analogous institutional measure. 
 Problem-oriented oversight depends upon private litigants being 
able to bring problems to the federal courts; the federal courts’ capacity to 
identify and respond to problems; and the efficacy of those responses, in 
terms of their ameliorative effect on agency policy and behavior.  In several 
regards, these criteria resemble those that inform the choice between private 
enforcement through civil litigation, on one hand, and public administration 
through agency action on the other, as means for the implementation of a 
regulatory regime.263   
The literature on private enforcement addresses problems that differ 
from the supervision of agency adjudication.  An illustrative example is 
whether lawmakers should pursue automobile safety through agency 
enforcement, such as recalls, or through private civil litigation, such as tort 
lawsuits.  But this scholarship helpfully identifies a number of institutional 
advantages and disadvantages that privately initiated litigation in generalist 
courts has, at least as it compares with some form of direct agency action.  
These considerations, or closely analogous ones, provide a useful blueprint 
to assess courts’ capacity to engage in problem-oriented oversight.  They 
suggest that the federal courts can perform this function successfully.  
Judicial review relies upon private litigants, those most directly affected, to 
bring flaws with agency decision-making to courts’ attention.  The process 
thus produces information about pathologies or bad policy efficiently.  The 
federal courts’ independence from the agencies under review and Congress 
can insulate their oversight from agency slack or political pressure.  Finally, 
Article III courts have sufficient influence with agencies to push for 
ameliorative changes, and oversight focused on rooting out the sorts of 
problems we describe does not overtax their expertise.     
A. Efficiency 
 
The private enforcement of a regulatory regime through civil  
                                                
263 For a comprehensive list of the considerations implicated by this choice, see Stephen B. 
Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 662-671 (2013). 
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litigation enjoys several efficiency advantages over public administration.  
Private enforcement spares the expenditure of public resources on 
enforcement while leveraging the capacity of the private bar toward this 
end.  It also relies upon those directly affected by the regulatory regime to 
trigger the enforcement process and thus likely produces information about 
the regime’s implementation or lack thereof particularly readily.264  The 
efficiency case for problem-oriented oversight through judicial review is 
less straightforward, but it probably favors it over other forms of agency 
oversight that do not rely upon private initiative.   
1. Resources 
 
Private enforcement enjoys at least two types of resource advantages  
over public administration.  First, the public bears only those direct costs 
that relate to the judiciary’s involvement.  Otherwise, the costs of 
enforcement are internalized by the plaintiff, the party seeking to benefit, 
and the defendant, the party that has allegedly violated the regime.  Second, 
by delegating the law enforcement task to private lawyers, private 
enforcement multiplies the number of personnel involved in a regime’s 
implementation without increasing the size of the federal bureaucracy. 
 Problem-oriented oversight through judicial review may not enjoy 
the first advantage as convincingly.  Because the federal government is the 
defendant or appellee, it must foot its own defense costs and, at least for 
social security cases, pay EAJA fees when claimants obtain certain types of 
favorable outcomes.265  The agency could invest these resources in, say, an 
expansive audit program if it did not have to litigate.   
This sort of audit program, however, would require a politically 
dicey expansion of the federal bureaucracy.  The SSA’s program of pre-
effectuation review offers a useful comparison.  Each year, the agency’s 
Division of Quality randomly selects a small percentage of ALJ decisions 
that are favorable to claimants, and thus cannot be appealed, for further 
review before notice of the favorable decision goes to the claimant.  In FY 
2015, for instance, the Division’s 119 staff members reviewed about 4,500 
decisions and identified concerns in approximately 900 of them.266  The 
same year the federal courts remanded 8,646 cases.267  Keeping the rate at 
                                                
264 Burbank et al., supra note 263 at 662-664; Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation 
of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 
VA. L. REV. 93, 108 (2005). 
265 On EAJA obligations, see, e.g., Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
266 SOC. SEC. ADMIN, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT REPORT, PRE-
EFFECTUATION REVIEWS OF FAVORABLE HEARING DECISIONS 1-2 (2017); id. at 4 n.14. 
267 Court Remands as a Percentage of New Court Cases Filed, at 
https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC05_Court_Remands_NCC_Filed.html. 
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which Division staff members find flaws constant, assuming that each 
member’s caseload remains fixed, and assuming that decisions denying and 
allowing claims contain errors with the same frequency, the Division would 
have to expand by more than 1,000 staff members to catch the same number 
of mistakes as the federal courts do.  By delegating much of the problem 
identification task to private litigants and federal judges, judicial review 
spares the SSA this immense bureaucratic expansion.268  
Problem-oriented oversight through judicial review is not 
necessarily as resource-friendly as private enforcement, although the 
politics of bureaucratic expansion may make its costs easier for Congress to 
swallow.  But the case for judicial review requires more.  In Part II, we 
questioned the value of court-based error correction on opportunity cost 
grounds.  The same concern warrants discussion here: if the resources 
invested in judicial review were spent instead on agency adjudication, 
would fewer problems arise in the first place? 
On this score, the distinction between problems and errors makes the 
case for problem-oriented oversight stronger than that for error correction.  
Errors may result because an overworked ALJ does not have time to review 
a lengthy set of medical records thoroughly, or because an overextended IJ 
cannot probe an immigrant’s story deeply enough.  Logically, if the ALJ or 
IJ had more time, as a lower case load might permit, she would make fewer 
such errors.  If the agency adopts a bad policy, however, an increase in 
adjudicator resources will do nothing to decrease the number of problematic 
adjudicator decisions.  All decisions that comport with the policy, whether 
issued by a harried adjudicator or a relaxed one, will suffer.   
 The same outcome likely obtains when problems result from 
entrenched agency pathologies.  If an SSA hearing office is mismanaged or 
suffers from bad morale, the addition of a new ALJ or two, or the hiring of 
three new decision writers, likely will not have a dramatic ameliorative 
effect.  If an IJ harbors bias against immigrants, or if an ALJ thinks that 
most claimants are lazy ne’er do wells, a 10% caseload reduction is unlikely 
to change her mind.  Excessive caseloads may deepen a pathology’s 
entrenchment,269 but a positive correlation does not necessarily or even 
often exist between caseloads and pathologies.  The SSA’s Miami Hearing 
                                                
268 Presumably the SSA’s Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) could shrink significantly if 
the agency did not have to defend its decisions in the federal courts.  Presently, OGC has 
about 600 lawyers.  See https://www.goinhouse.com/jobs/2216866-regional-chief-counsel-
atlanta-at-social-security-administration.  If one assumes that each OGC attorneys spend 
5/6 of his or her time on federal court appeals, an end to judicial review could enable the 
SSA to downsize OGC by 500 lawyers.  An investment of these resources in Division of 
Quality staff would still require a net increase of 500 personnel.     
269 E.g., Marcia Coyle, Burnout, Stress Plague Immigration Judges, NAT’L L.J., July 13, 
2009.  
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Office, for instance, suffers from management and morale problems,270 
even though its productivity currently ranks it dead last among the country’s 
163 offices.271  In FY 2012, the year claimants filed Padro v. Colvin, 
Queens Hearing Office ALJs decided fewer cases per capita than those from 
any other hearing office in the country.272 
2. Information Production 
 
Another efficiency concern relates closely to the resources  
consideration. Private enforcement compares favorably to public 
administration because it relies on those with the best information, the 
injured parties, to identify misconduct and initiate a response.  A version of 
this advantage is one of the chief arguments in favor of fire alarm 
oversight.273  Rather than proactively audit an agency itself, Congress can 
more efficiently monitor agency performance if third parties bring 
misconduct to its attention.   
 Judicial review unquestionably brings problems with agency 
decision-making to the fore more cheaply than some sort of internal agency 
auditing process can do.  Depending upon how court access gets structured, 
barriers to judicial review can select for cases that are most likely to involve 
flawed decisions.274  As discussed in Part II, hurdles for social security 
claimants can discourage a lot of potential appeals, and presumably those 
with strong claims are more likely to tough it out.  Lawyers who represent 
social security claimants, to mention one barrier, get paid either by 
contingency or through EAJA fees, both of which require a claimant victory 
in federal court.  Such hurdles should ensure that, of the appeals that get 
filed in federal court, many involve flawed ALJ decisions.  Some of these 
                                                
270 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, WORKLOAD OVERSIGHT IN THE 
MIAMI HEARING OFFICE (2016). 
271 
www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/04_Disposition_Per_Day_Per_ALJ_Ranking_Report.html. 
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www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/archive/04_FY2012/04_September_Disposition_Per_Day_
Per_ALJ_Ranking_Report.pdf. 
273 McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 169 at 168. 
274 The incentives that fuel appeals or barriers that limit them may be more complicated in 
other contexts.  Some have argued, albeit with little empirical basis, that overly lax policies 
of granting stays of removal pending review have incentivized immigrants to file meritless 
appeals.  Michael Kagan et al., Buying Time? False Assumptions About Abusive Appeals, 
63 CATH. U. L. REV. 679, 688, 692-694, 722-723 (2014).  If so, then the pool of appeals 
before the circuits will include plenty of reasonable IJ decisions.  In contrast, robust 
evidence suggests that detention discourages appeals.  Given that the immigrant can leave 
detention if she abandons her appeal and accepts removal, the fact that she remains 
incarcerated increases the likelihood that the IJ’s decision includes an error or resulted 
from a problem.  
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decisions will involve mistakes and not problems, to be sure, and thus 
problem-oriented oversight succeeds only if courts can reliably distinguish 
between the two categories.  But the subset is unlikely to involve a large 
number of correct decisions the way a random audit might, and thus the 
system operates efficiently to bring problems to courts’ attention. 
 The SSA’s Division of Quality example is again illustrative.  From 
2011-2015, the Division of Quality randomly selected 1.4% of ALJ 
decisions allowing benefits for pre-effectuation review.275  In 80% of 
instances, the division “effectuated” the case with no further action taken, 
suggesting that it found grounds for concern in only one out of five cases it 
reviewed.276  Over the same period, the federal courts remanded 43% of 
social security appeals.277  Although the comparison between the two rates 
is not straightforward, it suggests, however crudely, that properly 
incentivized private litigants identify flawed decisions, and thus generate 
information for oversight, more efficiently than a random audit can.   
B. Independence 
 
The efficiency case for problem-oriented oversight through judicial  
review contrasts it with something like an audit, a method that relies on 
agency personnel proactively searching for flaws in adjudicator decision-
making.  But agencies can engage in their own version of problem-oriented 
oversight through an appeals system.  Internal appellate review places the 
onus on the private litigant to come forward and thus should generate 
information about agency performance more efficiently than a randomized 
audit, if not as markedly so as Article III review.278 
 Problem-oriented oversight through internal appellate review only 
works if appellate personnel within the agency can catch problems and 
respond to them successfully.  In recent years the Appeals Council and the 
BIA have attracted criticism for inconsistent and sometimes arbitrary 
decision-making.279  This perceived problem surely results, at least in part, 
                                                
275 SSA OIG, PRE-EFFECTUATION REVIEW, supra note 266 at 1. 
276 Id. at 2. 
277 Data on the percentage of remands from 2011-2015 are available here: 
www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/AC05_Court_Remands_NCC_Filed.html. 
278 One reason why internal agency appellate review might not generate information as 
efficiently is that the barriers to appeal are lower.  To appeal an ALJ’s decision, for 
example, a claimant typically files little more than a three-page, often boilerplate letter 
identifying grounds for reversal.  GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 28.  Moreover, 
someone who appeals to federal court has already appealed and lost within the agency, and 
thus has been pursuing her appeal for longer and more doggedly than those who have only 
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279 E.g., GELBACH & MARCUS, supra note 16 at 28; David Haumsan, The Failure of 
Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177, 1180-1181 (2016). 
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from institutional determinants, including a paucity of time and resources.  
If Appeals Council adjudicators have to decide up to twelve cases per day, 
then their capacity to detect and respond to problems likely suffers.  But the 
institutional case for Article III review does not depend upon whether these 
critiques are accurate or not.  Article III review promises several 
independence advantages that internal appellate review lacks.  
The literature on private enforcement identifies independence as an 
important advantage privately initiated litigation enjoys over direct agency 
action.  Public administration can suffer from “agency slack,” or “the 
tendency of government regulators to under-enforce certain statutory 
requirements because of political pressure, lobbying by regulated entities, or 
the laziness or self-interest of the regulators themselves.”280  A concern in 
times of divided government that the President might steer agencies away 
from Congress’s regulatory objectives prompted the sharp increase from the 
1960s onwards in the number of statutes delegating enforcement to private 
litigation.281  Several analogous influences can interfere with an agency’s 
self-oversight.  Review in Article III courts insulates oversight from these 
pressures and enjoys an institutional advantage for this reason. 
1. Agency Interests 
 
An agency may be tempted to oversee its adjudicators in a manner  
that casts their performances in the best possible light or that avoids internal 
conflict.  In 2012, for example, the DOJ’s Inspector General faulted the 
EOIR for measuring its own performance in a manner that “overstate[d] the 
actual accomplishments of” immigration courts. 282  The EOIR used a 
method for counting case completions that exaggerated IJ productivity, and 
it assessed efforts to meet timeliness goals in a way that did not capture how 
long immigrants actually had to wait to get their cases decided.283  A quality 
review system at the Board of Veterans’ Appeals samples one out of every 
twenty decisions by veterans’ law judges (“VLJs”) to look for flaws.284  A 
decision is considered flawed only if no reasonable VLJ would have issued 
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the decision under scrutiny, not if the reviewer thinks the case was actually 
decided correctly.285  This threshold may avoid conflict with VLJs, who 
might resent second-guessing by personnel of less bureaucratic stature.  But 
it does not come close to predicting how well VLJ opinions will fare on 
appeal.286 
 The self-interest problem can taint oversight through internal 
appellate review as well.  The SSA uses the Appeals Council “agree” rate as 
an indicator of ALJ performance, mining internal appeals for information in 
a manner similar to what we describe in Part III.  A rising agree rate 
indicates improved ALJ performance, or so the logic goes.287  But if the 
Appeals Council’s review becomes more deferential, then a rising agree rate 
indicates nothing at all about improved ALJ performance.  Under these 
conditions, not only does internal appellate review function less 
successfully as an oversight mechanism, it can also affect other agency 
oversight methods that rely upon information generated by the appellate 
tribunal.288 
 Finally, an agency may simply not want to oversee itself, even if it 
can glean information efficiently through internal appellate review.  This 
tendency is all but guaranteed when it comes to problems of flawed policy.  
If the SSA instructs ALJs to use certain flawed text for discussions of 
credibility, the Appeals Council will not fault ALJs for doing so, and the 
problem will not show up in Appeals Council decision patterns.  The SSA 
has mined Appeals Council data to identify and root out some entrenched 
decision-making pathologies, the second type of problem.  But, as far as we 
know, the EOIR has not used BIA decisions for this purpose.289  In fact, as 
far as we know, neither the EOIR nor the DOJ’s Inspector General has 
                                                
285 Id. at 9-10. 
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88% of the VLJ decisions it reviewed). 
287 Ray & Lubbers, supra note 129 at 1606; SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
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See generally Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights From Within?  Inspectors General and 
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assessed the quality of IJ decision-making using BIA data.  Certainly 
neither has embarked upon an effort to identify and respond to problems 
commensurate with the campaign against pathologies in immigration cases 
the federal courts of appeals has waged. 
2. Political Independence 
 
Related to agency self-interest is politics’ looming influence.  An  
agency might not prioritize problem-oriented oversight, even if internal 
appeals offer it an opportunity to do so efficiently, if such oversight is 
politically inexpedient.  An agency might align its self-policing with what it 
perceives as Congress’s preferences.  Congress can insist upon this 
alignment by enacting legislation requiring the agency to focus on particular 
problems.290   
 The agency may prioritize certain forms of oversight over others, 
even in the absence of legislation directing it to do so, to minimize conflict 
with Congress.  Starting in 2011, roughly at the same time as the 
Huntington scandal, the SSA began to use Appeals Council data to identify 
problematic ALJs for “focused reviews.”291  Of the first fifty ALJs selected, 
thirty were identified because they had allowance rates that exceeded 
75%.292  By FY 2013, the number of high allowance rate ALJs had dropped 
precipitously, 293  a fact the agency’s Chief Administrative Law Judge 
emphasized when she insisted at a Senate Committee hearing that “quality 
is improving.”294  But the number of low allowance rate ALJs, whose 
decisions are especially likely to generate court remands, ticked up slightly 
during the same period.295  All of this happened as the SSA endured intense 
Congressional scrutiny for its perceived profligacy with benefits.296 
 In recent years, Congressional oversight of immigration policy has 
emphasized enforcement.297  President Trump’s first budget blueprint insists 
that its proposal that Congress authorize the EOIR to hire seventy-five new 
IJs will help to “combat[] illegal entry and unlawful presence in the United 
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States.”298  In light of such pressures, the likelihood that the EOIR will 
prioritize oversight that looks for problems disadvantaging immigrants 
seems low.299 
Congress’s formal power to oversee the federal courts 
notwithstanding,300 its attempts to exercise this power have been modest 
compared with its scrutiny of federal agencies.301  Moreover, the federal 
courts’ diverse docket insulates them from some sort of politicized 
retaliation, should their decisions in agency appeals tend to skew in one 
manner or another.  Congress could always respond to a pattern of decisions 
it dislikes by altering the federal courts’ jurisdiction or changing a standard 
of review.  But short of such focused legislation, Congress is unlikely to use 
another sanction, like a budget cut, to pressure the federal courts because 
doing so will adversely affect other, more privileged, areas of their docket. 
C. Capacity 
 
Our critique of judicial review’s regulative function questions the  
capacity of courts to force agencies to abide by precedent.  Judicial efforts 
to engage in problem-oriented oversight warrant the same scrutiny, 
although what information presently exists indicates that courts may 
succeed in prodding agencies to respond to their diagnoses of certain 
problems.  The literature on private enforcement suggests two other reasons 
to question judges’ capacity to administer regulatory regimes, their 
inexpertness and the limited geographic reach of their decisions.  Neither is 
a concern for court-based problem-oriented oversight. 
1. Efficacy of Judicial Interventions 
 
The most obvious objection to judicial review’s oversight function 
involves its efficacy.  Neither the EOIR nor the SSA mines court remands 
for information that might help its adjudicators improve.  One might expect 
agencies to act with similar indifference when courts respond more 
aggressively to perceived problems. 
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A federal court can all but ensure that an agency will respond if it 
uses extreme measures, such as Rule 11 sanctions, injunctive relief, or an 
approval of a class action settlement requiring changes.302  Courts rarely do 
so, however.303  Still, the difference between an ordinary court remand and 
the sort of opinion a court might issue when addressing a problem gives 
reason to think that the latter can influence agency operations. 
The agency can fully comply with an ordinary court decision if an 
adjudicator conducts the proceedings on remand in accordance with the 
court’s instructions.  If the court demands nothing more, it cannot fault the 
agency for treating the remand as a one-off and not a source of constructive 
criticism.  A decision concluding that “the ALJ failed to give specific and 
legitimate reasons for discounting [a treating physician’s] opinion,” for 
instance, obliges the SSA to do no more than ensure the ALJ does so on 
remand, regardless of whether the ALJ’s hearing office is dysfunctional or 
if the ALJ routinely struggles with such evidence.304  A vast linguistic gulf 
separates this remand from a decision like Freismuth v. Astrue, where the 
district judge denounced disability adjudication as a “wholly dysfunctional 
administrative process” and threatened the SSA with “very deep trouble” if 
it didn’t take steps to fix observed problems.305  In response to the decision, 
the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Wisconsin insisted that his 
office had “been very much in conversation and communication – some of 
it quite productive – with” the SSA.306 
Robert Hume concluded his empirical study of agency 
responsiveness to courts with the finding that “words” in opinions like 
Freismuth “seem to matter,”307 for several reasons.  First, “[w]hen opinion 
language leaves agencies little room to maneuver, administrators might 
change their policies to avoid sanctions and maintain favorable relationships 
with judges.”308  As repeat players, agencies know that they risk angering a 
judge who will surely decide appeals going forward if they ignore clear 
instructions to change course.  While an angry judge could take out her 
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anger on only a small number of cases relative to the agency’s overall case 
load, agencies value their “reputational capital” and “credibility” with the 
federal courts and do not want to dissipate them.309  Perhaps for this reason, 
the Department of Justice has long had a policy of initiating an investigation 
any time a federal court of appeals identifies an IJ by name in an opinion.310 
Second, Hume suggests that a clear, strongly worded opinion can 
empower certain individuals within an agency who may prefer the sort of 
policy adjustment the court counsels relative to those who favor the status 
quo.311  Others have documented this “destabilization effect” within federal 
agencies that judicial opinions can produce.312  Perhaps agency officials 
have ignored a general counsel’s recommendation that adjudicators use 
different language when discussing someone’s credibility.  The right sort of 
judicial opinion faulting the agency for its credibility boilerplate can give 
the general counsel significant leverage to insist upon a policy change.313 
Third, as Hume reports, “research on administrative behavior . . . 
emphasizes that administrators are professionals who take their work 
seriously and try to do what is right.”314  Agency officials may feel obliged 
out of a sense of professional obligation to respond when courts give 
unambiguous and strongly worded feedback.315  This assumption, that 
agency personnel see themselves as professionals trying to discharge their 
mission as successfully as possible, underlies many of the SSA’s efforts to 
improve ALJ performance.316  It might also explain why congressional 
oversight is often effective.  Congress rarely passes legislation when a fire 
alarm rings.317  An agency may worry about its budget appropriation, but 
investigatory committees rarely have budgetary powers, and appropriations 
                                                
309 HUME, supra note 117 at 116. 
310 Immigration Prof., L.A. Immigration Judge Under Fire, Dec. 20, 2009, at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2009/12/la-immigration-judge-under-
fire.html; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Policies and 
Procedures, May 21, 2015, at 1 (on file with authors).  The SSA is more vague about how it 
responds to judicial criticism, but insists that it “‘carefully analyzes Federal court 
decisions’” and “‘value[s] the courts’ perspective . . . .”  Marilyn Odendahl, Disability 
Denials Draw Criticism, INDIANA LAWYER, Apr. 6, 2016.   
311 HUME, supra note 117 at 75-76. 
312 Hal G. Rainey, Book Review, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 303, 305 (2002) 
(reviewing MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS?  POLITICS AND 
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS (2001)); Charles F. Sabel & William H. 
Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1015, 1078 (2004). 
313 HUME, supra note 117 at 76. 
314 HUME, supra note 117 at 8-9. 
315 HUME, supra note 117 at 113. 
316 Ray & Lubbers, supra note 129 at 1598. 
317 Beerman, supra note 164 at 121-139. 
Rethinking Judicial Review 
 62 
are a clumsy, blunt tool to use to insist upon specific change.318  Maybe 
congressional oversight works because agencies want to do the right thing.  
If so, court pressure can have the same effect. 
2. Expertise 
 
A standard critique of private enforcement compares courts  
unfavorably to agencies as generalists lacking in sufficient expertise to 
administer a regulatory regime optimally.319  One version of this critique 
challenges judicial review’s oversight function on grounds that courts 
cannot diagnose problems with adjudication as expertly as agencies can.  
The charge has force in two instances.  First, a judicial attempt to force 
agencies into large-scale procedural changes of the sort that could 
dramatically upend settled agency practice should give pause.  As Adrian 
Vermeule argues, “[t]he federal judicial system is not set up, not equipped, 
to engage in a sustained course of synoptic institutional engineering.”320  
But, as Vermeule also argues, the federal courts, aware of their institutional 
limitations, have largely surrendered control over fundamental matters of 
procedural design to agencies.321   
 The expertise critique also has some bite when courts fail to 
appreciate that agency adjudicators have to optimize how they conduct their 
proceedings under significant constraints.  Although some federal judges 
have a decent sense of the limits under which agency adjudicators labor,322 
others may be surprisingly unaware of adjudicator caseloads and their 
inadequate support.323  Attempts to micromanage how adjudicators manage 
cases deserve criticism, as federal judges may not understand how resource 
inadequacies constrain the process agency adjudicators can afford.324 
 Most of the problems we have discussed in this Article, however, 
require neither a deep appreciation for immutable determinants that require 
adjudicators to act in certain ways, nor an omniscient eye for large-scale 
procedural design.  The fact that IJs decide 1,000 cases per year does not 
excuse IJ bias against categories of immigrants.  The SSA has to ask ALJs 
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to decide 500-700 cases per year; flaws in the credibility boilerplate the 
agency has ALJs insert into their decisions does not help them work 
through their dockets more quickly.  Properly conducted, problem-oriented 
oversight should operate as a form of arbitrary and capricious review, a type 
of oversight that permits the agency to continue in a particular procedural 
vein if it has a plausible reason to do so.   
A second version of the expertise critique is unique to judicial 
review of high volume agency adjudication.  This data gathering and 
analysis we describe in Part III may seem far afield from core judicial 
competencies, and may beg the question of whether courts deciding one 
case at a time can assemble information usefully from individual appeals 
that can accurately indicate problems.   
To a certain extent, our method merely illustrates the sort of 
thinking that a judge should engage in to identify patterns and spot 
problems.  A court does not have to assemble precisely the heat map we 
describe.  Indeed, court competencies probably enable a district or circuit 
clerk’s office to develop an even more sophisticated approach to problem 
identification.  Some courts already assemble some of the sort of 
information that a problem-oriented court would harvest from individual 
appeals.  The Ninth Circuit does so for all cases, not just one category or 
another.  There, a staff attorney reviews each appeal once it is fully briefed, 
judges its complexity, and prepares a “case inventory” that identifies the 
issues the appeal raises.  The issues get entered into a searchable database, 
to enable the Ninth Circuit to track it along with cases raising similar 
issues.325  
The data analysis that problem-oriented judicial review requires 
should likewise pose little challenge.  The patterns courts can identify in the 
data should prompt them to look at relevant appeals in a different light, but 
they should not react mechanistically to some statistical anomaly as 
conclusive proof of a problem.  The SSA looks for outliers in ALJ decision 
data as guides to where it needs to investigate further.326  A trend’s 
emergence in court data should likewise further investigation, albeit of the 
sort that a court can undertake.  Perhaps the fact that courts remand an IJ’s 
claims involving immigrant credibility at an unusually high rate should 
signal to a judge that she take a hard look at a particular appeal for signs of 
IJ bias.  Judges should not automatically remand a case involving mental 
impairments, much less pen some screed on bad SSA policy, simply 
because remand data indicate a sharp uptick across ALJs and hearing 
offices for cases involving mental impairments.  But such indications would 
                                                
325 Harry Pregerson & Suzanne D. Painter-Thorne, The Seven Virtues of Appellate Brief-
Writing: An Update from the Bench, 38 SW. L. REV. 221, 223 (2008). 
326 Ray & Lubbers, supra note 129 at 1595. 
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signal to judges to pay particular attention to how the agency describes 
applicable policy in such cases.   
3. Geographical Dispersion 
 
The literature on private enforcement cites the judiciary’s  
geographic dispersion as a comparative disadvantage.  A federal agency can 
administer a regulatory regime uniformly, subjecting the regulated entity to 
a consistent set of constraints nationwide.  In contrast, regulation through 
private tort litigation, for example, subjects the defendant to different 
obligations in different places.   
 Geographic dispersion creates a somewhat different difficulty for 
problem-oriented oversight through judicial review.  When the problem is 
one of a flawed policy, then a court decision faulting the agency for its 
adoption suffers the same limitations as one attempting to regulate the 
agency through precedent.  The agency, motivated by a felt obligation to 
administer a single policy nationally, and concerned about adjudicator 
inconsistency, might resist making any changes in response to judicial 
chastisement. 
 When, however, a problem involves an entrenched decision-making 
pathology, the federal judiciary’s geographic dispersion is often a feature, 
not a bug.  Provided that venue rules require that decisions from a particular 
set of adjudicators go consistently to a particular set of judges, 327  a 
geographically dispersed system of judicial review will better ensure that 
pathologies discoloring adjudication in a particular immigration court or a 
particular hearing office come to a federal judge’s attention.  Most appeals 
from disability benefits decisions rendered by ALJs in the Tucson Hearing 
Office get filed in the District of Arizona.328  A District of Arizona judge 
will see decisions by the same ALJ repeatedly, and certainly will review 
decisions from the same hearing office.  If, however, all social security 
appeals were to proceed in a single national social security court, the 
chances are slim that one of its judges would see multiple appeals from the 
same ALJ, or that one of its judges would develop a feel for a problem 
arising at one of the SSA’s 166 hearing offices.  If cases are randomly 
assigned, then a lot of time could pass before one of the national court’s 
judges saw the same ALJ’s name on an appealed decision, or even the same 
                                                
327 On venue choices for social security cases, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  On venue for 
immigration cases, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). 
328 A Tucson ALJ will most likely decide cases involving Tucson claimants.  HALLEX, 
supra note 144 § I-2-0-70.  Appeals from Tucson claimants to the federal courts most 
likely will go to the District of Arizona.  42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 
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originating hearing office.  A judge on this national court would be more 
likely to mistake a problem for an error. 
CONCLUSION 
The standard justifications for judicial review of high volume 
agency adjudication are unsatisfying.  Institutional clashes interfere with the 
corrective, regulative, and critical functions the federal courts attempt to 
serve, rightly prompting doubt that the benefits courts create when they 
discharge these functions exceed judicial review’s costs.  Problem-oriented 
oversight, suffering from fewer of these institutionally determined 
limitations, creates additional benefits.  When added to the mix, the 
contributions courts make when they ferret out problems tip the balance in 
favor of judicial review.   
We recognize that the costs and benefits of judicial review are 
difficult to quantify with precision.329  Reasonable people may disagree 
with the empirical assertions we make about how courts can act and how 
agencies might respond.  Even so, an understanding of problem-oriented 
oversight is important, for at least two reasons.  First, as future scholars and 
policymakers rethink judicial review of high volume agency adjudication, 
they should measure courts’ capacities to identify and help fix problems as 
they assess the value of all the contributions courts can make.  Second, and 
perhaps more important, judicial review is here to stay, at least for the time 
being.  As long as it remains so, courts can maximize the value they add to 
agency adjudication by engaging in problem-oriented oversight. 	
 
                                                
329 We thank Andy Coan for helping us to formulate this concluding thought. 
